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ARTICLES 
THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF CHIEF JUDGE LAWRENCE H. 
COOKE: “TRULY AN EXEMPLARY LIFE.  A LIFE WELL LIVED”1 
Jay C. Carlisle II*† 
Anthony DiPietro** 
INTRODUCTION 
It is an appropriate tribute to the late Chief Judge of New York, 
Lawrence H. Cooke, that this article be devoted to a man who many 
leaders of the bench, bar, and academia consider to be the greatest 
 
* Jay C. Carlisle II is one of the founding professors of Pace University School of Law.  He is 
a commissioner for the New York State Law Revision Commission, an elected Life Fellow of 
the American Bar Foundation, and a referee for the New York State Commission on Judicial 
Conduct.  Mr. Carlisle is also senior counsel at Collier, Halpern, & Newberg, LLP.   
† Chief Judge of New York Lawrence H. Cooke was my friend, mentor, and colleague for 
twenty-five years.  I was a member of his Task Force on Women and the Courts and one of 
the drafters of the Task Force final report, which was featured on the front page of the New 
York Times.  After Chief Judge Cooke retired from the Court of Appeals in 1984, he practiced 
law until Pace Law School hired him in 1989 as a distinguished professor of law.  "Professor" 
Cooke was on our faculty until 1992 and was consistently rated by our students as a superb 
teacher.  
 The Chief was a member of the Court of Appeals for ten years.  He made his mark both as 
a jurist and administrator.  The Chief was a diligent defender of human rights, writing many 
opinions demonstrating his concern for the constitutional rights of defendants, free speech, 
and the protection of persons against discrimination.  His proudest success was bringing 
court backlogs under control, disposing of 2.4 million cases in 1983, an increase of 500,000 
from 1979.  Chief Judge Cooke always followed the high road and did so with incredible 
charm, humor, and decency.  He passed away on August 17, 2000, at the age of 85, in 
Monticello, New York.  I continue to miss him and am grateful to the Albany Law Review for 
publishing this article. 
** Anthony DiPietro, Esq., is a criminal defense attorney representing individuals in 
complex federal and state post-conviction litigation.  Mr. DiPietro graduated from Pace 
University School of Law, magna cum laude.  His law office is located in White Plains, New 
York.  The authors wish to thank several former law students of Professor Carlisle’s 
Advanced Civil Procedure course at Pace University School of Law (Spring 2013): Agatha 
Rudz, Susan Carmichael, Britney Edwards, Janice Castro, and Jessica Yanefski, for their 
help and contributions to this article. 
1 Judith S. Kaye, In Memoriam: Lawrence H. Cooke: 1914-2000, 72 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 50, 
51 (2000).  
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jurist to ever serve on New York State's highest court.  Chief Judge 
Cooke, better known as Larry, served with honor and distinction as 
an associate judge of the Court of Appeals, and later as Chief 
Judge.2 
Lawrence H. Cooke was a man “motivated by love—for his family, 
for the law, for people and life in general.”3  He led a full and 
meaningful life that exemplified fundamental virtues of peace, 
integrity, and fairness.4  While growing up in Monticello, New York, 
a town on the foothills of the Catskill Mountains, his parents taught 
him that dedication and hard work was required in order to be 
successful.5 His father, a former District Attorney for Sullivan 
County, showed him that public servants must always “take the 
high road”6 in their affairs and never be obligated to anyone.7 
Chief Judge Cooke once wrote that he considered his father “the 
personification of virtue.  He was a man of common sense and 
logic—with his feet always solidly on the ground.”8  Chief Judge 
Cooke’s father’s teachings influenced his work ethic, which resulted 
in him working up to eighteen hours per day to fulfill his judicial 
duties.9  Chief Judge Cooke recognized that his time on the court 
was a “sacred mission” in order to provide litigants a full and fair 
process.10 
In 1981, during a keynote address, Chief Judge Cooke stated: 
“Justice is the great commodity.”11  He explained that leaders 
should always be guided by principles of justice and equality.  In 
this regard, Chief Judge Cooke explained that great historical 
leaders appreciated this concept, noting as an example that 
Abraham Lincoln understood “the . . . important idea that the law 
represented . . . the idea of fairness;” Thomas Jefferson “exalted the 
 
2 Id. at 50. 
3 Laurie Stuart, Editorial, Goodbye Judge Cooke, RIVER REP. (Aug. 24, 2000), http://www. 
riverreporter.com/issues/00-08-24/editorial.htm. 
4 Chief Judge Cooke sought justice throughout his judicial career in its purest form.  See, 
e.g., Anthony Kane et al., Tribute to Former Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, 70 N.Y. ST. B. J. 
46, 46 (1998). 
5 See Kane et al., supra note 4, at 46. 
6 Martha Middleton, Mr. Chief Activist, Cooke Is on a ‘Sacred Mission,’ 69 A.B.A. J. 431, 
431 (1983). 
7 Id. (“Justice [is] always the great virtue: all of us have a great duty to render justice and 
fairness to our neighbors in everyday affairs.”).   
8 Lawrence H. Cooke, Waste Not, Wait Not—A Consideration of Federal and State 
Jurisdiction, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 895, 895 (1981).  
9 See Middleton, supra note 6, at 431. 
10 See id. (“When I lay down my head at night time or finally, I want to say I’ve done 
everything I can.”). 
11 Lawrence H. Cooke, Remarks of the Chief Judge of the State of New York, 2 PACE L. REV. 
231, 243 (1982). 
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concept of ‘equal and exact justice to all;’” and Frederick Douglass 
observed that “[t]he lesson which the American people must learn    
. . . is that equal manhood means equal rights.”12  Following this 
approach himself, Chief Judge Cooke left a legacy defending equal 
justice and fundamental fairness for all people. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 At the age of twenty, Chief Judge Cooke graduated cum laude 
from Georgetown University,13 and later received the John Carroll 
Award.14  Upon graduating from Georgetown, Chief Judge Cooke 
was accepted into Harvard Law School, where he began his legal 
education.15  He later transferred and graduated from Albany Law 
School.16  Chief Judge Cooke also received honorary LLB or LLD 
degrees from Albany Law School, Union University, Siena College, 
Brooklyn Law School, New York University, Pace University, and 
Syracuse University.17 
After graduating from Albany Law School, the Chief worked at 
the law office of John Lyons, a well-known Sullivan Country trial 
lawyer.18  In 1947, he became the Chairman of the Sullivan County 
Board of Supervisors.19  After working for John Lyons, Chief Judge 
Cooke went into private practice and in 1953, ran for County Court 
Judge.20  A year later, Cooke was elected as Sullivan County Judge, 
Surrogate and Children’s Court Judge.21  In 1961, Cooke was named 
to the New York State Supreme Court, followed by an appointment 
to the Appellate Division, Third Department, in 1969.22  He was 
elected to the Court of Appeals as an associate judge in 1974,23 and 
in 1979, was appointed Chief Judge.24  Chief Judge Cooke served on 
New York’s highest court with novel admiration from his colleagues, 
and is remembered as one of the most influential and celebrated 
 
12 Id. at 243–44. 
13 Kane et al., supra note 4, at 46. 
14 Hon. Lawrence H. Cooke, TIMES HERALD-REC. (Aug. 19, 2000), http://choicesmhc.com/fil 
es/monticello/history/cookethr.htm. 
15 Kane et al., supra note 4, at 46. 
16 See id.  
17 Hon. Lawrence H. Cooke, supra note 14.  
18 Kane et al., supra note 4, at 46. 
19 Hon. Lawrence H. Cooke, supra note 14. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Kane et al., supra note 4, at 47. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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jurists.25  
During his tenure on the bench, Chief Judge Cooke wrote many 
instructive opinions on criminal law and procedure,26 New York 
Practice, the right to free press, guardianship, and victim rights.27  
The Chief authored significant opinions relating to the development 
of the state’s independence and the progression of New York’s 
Constitution.28  Chief Judge Cooke’s recognition of the state’s 
judicial sovereignty allowed the state court to independently control 
fundamental issues, including searches and seizures and procedural 
due process rights.29  He was regarded as “a giant who helped 
ensure that, while the United States Supreme Court changed 
directions and its role, the New York Court of Appeals would 
continue to be an independent force and a national leader in 
safeguarding our rights and liberties.”30 
According to Chief Judge Cooke, each decision he authored was 
designed to provide sufficient notice and guidance to future 
litigants.  He explained that his rulings were: 
[A] yardstick that you can use for conduct in the future, so 
that when you pronounce a decision in a case, you can take 
that yardstick and measure it into a future case, so people 
know what they can do and what they have a right to do and 
 
25 See, e.g., A Dedication to Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 145, 145, 
154 (1984) (providing a dedication from the editors themselves, as well as from others in the 
legal community); see generally Hon. William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute of Chief Judge 
Charles S. Desmond, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987) (recognizing the New York Court of Appeals 
as a leader in state constitutionalism). 
26 A Dedication to Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, supra note 25, at 154 (“Perhaps the 
area of the law where Chief Judge Cooke’s voice speaks most distinctly and compellingly is 
that of the constitutional requirements in the criminal justice process.”). 
27 Id. at 155 (“To list all the topics on which he has contributed authoritatively to the 
growth of the law would be virtually to recapitulate the syllabus of [the legal] profession.”). 
28 See, e.g., People v. P. J. Video Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 559–60 (N.Y. 1986) (“State courts are 
bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court when reviewing federal statutes or applying the 
federal Constitution.  Under established principles of federalism, however, the states also 
have sovereign powers.  When their courts interpret state statutes or the state Constitution 
the decisions of these courts are conclusive if not violative of federal law.  Although state 
courts may not circumscribe rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, they may 
interpret their own law to supplement or expand them.”). 
29 See, e.g., People v. Skinner, 417 N.E.2d 501, 502 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that the right to 
counsel attaches in a noncustodial setting once counsel has instructed the police not to 
question the defendant in his absence); People v. Rogers, 397 N.E.2d 709, 710 (N.Y. 1979) 
(holding that once an attorney has entered the proceeding, a defendant in custody may not be 
questioned further in the absence of counsel); People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 614 (N.Y. 
1978) (holding that a defendant under indictment and in custody may not waive the right to 
counsel unless the waiver is made in the presence of the defendant’s attorney). 
30 Vincent Martin Bonventre, Judges on Judges: The New York State Court of Appeals 
Judges’ Own Favorites in Court History, 71 ALB. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (2008). 
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what they shouldn’t do.31 
Distinguished Professor Vincent M. Bonventre of Albany Law 
School explained that Chief Judge Cooke was a judicial giant, who 
“led his colleagues on the court, and held the way for state supreme 
courts throughout the nation to take their constitutional guarantees 
seriously.  Indeed, the body of his opinions is a veritable call to arms 
to enforce fundamental law of the state in service of fundamental 
freedoms.”32 
While Chief Judge, Cooke also “served as Chairman of the 
Conference of Chief Judges and became President of the National 
Center for State Courts in 1982.”33  In 1986, President Reagan 
appointed the Chief to chair the State Justice Institute.34  In 1987, 
Chief Judge Cooke received the Distinguished Service Award from 
the National Center for State Courts.35  In appreciation of his 
service, the Sullivan County Courthouse was renamed the 
Lawrence H. Cooke Sullivan County Courthouse.36  In the latter 
part of his career, the Chief was also “of counsel to the Albany law 
firm of Couch, White, Brenner and Feigenbaum[,] and served as a 
member of the Board of Directors of the First National Bank of 
Jeffersonville.”37 
Chief Judge Cooke also utilized his status within the legal 
community to advocate for reform and protection of women’s 
rights.38  Notably, he advocated for changes to protect the rights of 
rape victims, whom he had felt “[we]re outside the effective 
protection of the law.”39  In addition, Chief Judge Cooke put into 
effect a rule that prohibited reimbursement for expenses of business 
transacted in facilities that discriminated on the grounds of gender 
and race.40  While acting as Chief Judge, he also appointed a 
twenty-three member panel, the Women in Law Task Force,41 to 
 
31 Kathy Schofield Zdeb, The Chief, ALB. L. SCH. UNION U. MAG., Spring 1995, at 8. 
32 Id. at 8–9. 
33 See Hon. Lawrence H. Cooke, sup-ra note 14. 
34 See Joyce Adolfsen & Lou Adolfsen, Lawrence Henry Cooke, HIST. SOC’Y N.Y. CTS., 
http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/history-legal-bench-courtappeals.html 
?http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/luminaries-court-appeals/cooke-lawr 
ence.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). 
35 See Lawrence Henry Cooke: Lawyer, State Chief Judge, PRABOOK, http://prabook 
.com/web/person-view.html?profileId=59287# (last visited Mar. 28, 2017). 
36 Kane et al., supra note 4, at 48. 
37 Hon. Lawrence H. Cooke, supra note 14. 
38 Adolfsen & Adolfsen, supra note 34. 
39 Id. 
40 Robert B. McKay, Six Short Tears of Meritorious Service as Chief Judge, in A Dedication 
to Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, supra note 25, at 153.  
41 At the time, a report by a special state task force that studied the courts for almost two 
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research gender inequalities42 in the court system.43  In 1982, Chief 
Judge Cooke was the only man to have ever been admitted as an 
honorary member of the New York State Women’s Bar 
Association.44 
During his professional career, Chief Judge Cooke was also active 
within his community.  He served as President of the Monticello 
Fire Department, Sullivan County Volunteer Firefighters 
Association, and the Hudson Valley Volunteer Firefighters 
Association.45  The Firemen’s Association of the State of New York 
presented him with the Golden Trumpet Award.46  Chief Judge 
Cooke was a member of St. Peter’s Roman Catholic Church, and 
praised by many religious organizations for his outreach to the 
community—receiving the Golda Meir Memorial Award from the 
Jewish Lawyers Guild and the Torch of Liberty by B’nai B’rith.47  
Chief Judge Cooke was also honored as the keynote speaker for the 
International Jewish Jurists and Lawyers Convention in 
Jerusalem.48 
II.  PROFESSOR OF LAW 
Chief Judge Cooke will be remembered for his many contributions 
to several law schools located in New York.  Among his many 
 
years concluded that bias against women in the New York State court system was so 
pervasive that women were often denied equal justice.  See Jeffrey Schmalz, Pervasive Sex 
Bias Found in Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/20/nyregi 
on/pervasive-sex-bias-found-in-courts.html (“The [twenty-three]-member panel—set up in 
May 1984 by Lawrence H. Cooke, then the state’s Chief Judge—concluded that female 
lawyers were ‘routinely’ demeaned and treated patronizingly by male judges and attorneys.  
The panel also found that the credibility of female witnesses was sometimes questioned 
because women were viewed by some judges as emotional and untrustworthy.  Calling the 
situation grave, the panel said some judges did not understand the nature of family violence 
and blamed the victims for it.”). 
42 Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 15, 
15 (1987) [hereinafter Women in the Courts Task Force] (“The New York Task Force on 
Women in the Courts has concluded that gender bias against women litigants, attorneys and 
court employees is a pervasive problem with grave consequences.  Women are often denied 
equal justice, equal treatment[,] and equal opportunity.”).   
43 UNIFIED COURT SYS. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., SUMMARY REPORT: NEW YORK TASK 
FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS 1 (Mar. 1986), http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/womeninthecourt 
s/pdfs/ny-task-force-on-women-in-the-courts-summary.pdf (including information relating to 
the Task Force’s objective, investigation, and findings); Women in the Courts Task Force, 
supra note 42. 
44 Tom Rue, Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke—“Justice is a Very Fragile Commodity,” River 
Rep., April 24, 1995. 
45 Hon. Lawrence H. Cooke, supra note 14. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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contributions, the Chief served as a founding board member of two 
publications produced by Albany Law School49 and taught at Pace 
University School of Law from 1988 to 1991.50 
During this time, he served as a mentor to law students and was 
influential throughout their studies.51  Former Pace students 
recalled that it was an honor to have the former Chief Judge of the 
New York Court of Appeals as a professor: “Judge Cooke enhanced 
Pace Law School’s reputation and enriched the lives of all who had 
the privilege to have him as their teacher.”52 
Likewise, many students at Albany Law were instructed by Chief 
Judge Cooke’s guest lectures.53  He would routinely lecture classes 
on various subjects, seeking to take an active and positive role in 
the development and direction of law students.54   
He spoke with the students, sharing his thoughts and 
feelings, his vision and convictions, his hopes and 
expectations for them and their chosen profession.  He would 
call upon them to “search for justice, to render justice, the 
ennobling feature” of a career in the law—“to help the 
community and rectify the wrongs that come your way and 
to support those that need your help.”55 
Despite his distinguished resume, students were most amazed by 
Chief Judge Cooke’s humble approach.  He reminded students that 
he was just a “man.”  The Chief taught students that they should 
respect members of the bench, but never be afraid to speak and 
advocate for their clients.56  One former student stated that Chief 
Judge Cooke “was a truly humble man and humanized himself, and 
gave us a different perspective as to who a Judge is.  Every day, 
when I am advocating a case at trial, or upon a motion/appeal, I 
 
49 Vincent Martin Bonventre, Tribute to Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1, 
2 (2000) (noting that Chief Judge Cooke helped the Albany Law Review plan and inaugurate 
its State Constitutional Commentary issue, and helped create the Government Law & Policy 
Journal).  
50 Rue, supra note 44. 
51 In addition to teaching at Pace, Chief Judge Cooke also visited other law schools to 
speak with students about law, life, and ethics.  See Vincent Martin Bonventre, Professional 
Responsibility, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 505, 521 (1992).  Cooke was lauded as a model of 
professional responsibility and recognized for his teaching that a lawyer should always 
remember: “When in doubt take the high road.”  Id. at 522. 
52 Letter from Jacqueline Hatter, Esq., to Jay Carlisle, II, Professor of Law, Pace Law Sch. 
(Aug. 29, 2012) (on file with author) (“Judge Cooke was a brilliant jurist and teacher, as well 
as a kind and good-hearted person.”). 
53 Bonventre, supra note 49, at 2.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Interview with Anthony Pirrotti, Jr., Esq. (2012). 
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remember the life lesson he gave us.”57  Another former student 
recalls Judge Cooke telling his class: “You must argue with a fire in 
your belly!” when advocating for what is fair and just.58  
Chief Judge Cooke always tried to influence his students to take 
an active role in the legal community and to strive for self-
betterment as a legal practitioner.59  He instructed his students to 
always be ethical and passionate about their work.  He also offered 
the advice that lawyers should avoid ethical problems and “when in 
doubt take the high road.”60  Former students of Chief Judge Cooke 
recounted that their “best memories of the class, however, relate[d] 
not to Lawrence Cooke the jurist, but Lawrence Cooke the man.”61 
Chief Judge Cooke’s admiration was so widespread that many 
students at Pace even petitioned the dean of the law school upon 
notice that he was retiring from teaching.  The students sent 
several hundred letters to the dean of the law school demanding 
that all efforts be employed to keep Chief Judge Cooke.62  To his 
students, his presence became an integral part to their legal 
education and life.63 
III.  NEW YORK COURT REFORM 
In the 1970s and 1980s, New York’s court system was considered 
one of the most active and expensive systems in the world.64  By 
1981, New York City’s Supreme Court had 22,796 indictments and 
over 173,288 criminal defendants were arraigned on misdemeanor 
charges, requiring 331,580 courtroom appearances to process felony 
 
57 Id. 
58 Letter from Steven Habiague, Esq., to Jay Carlisle, II, Professor of Law, Pace Law Sch. 
(Sept. 2, 2012) (on file with author).  
59 Interview with Joseph Ruhl, Esq. (2012) (“Judge Cooke’s photograph, which is a replica 
of his portrait on display in the New York State Court of Appeals, is on the wall in my office 
at Wilson Elser, with a personal handwritten note from Chief Judge Cooke.  When I look at it, 
I am reminded of the amazing person, who inspired me to strive to be an excellent lawyer and 
colleague, and to be involved in activities for the betterment of the legal profession.”). 
60 Bonventre, supra note 49, at 3.  
61 Interview with Joseph Ruhl, Esq. (2012) (“Before the course began, I—as well as other 
members of the seminar—received a large package in the student mail.  The package was 
from Chief Judge Cooke and contained the course book that he had purchased for the 
students of the class at his own expense.  It was a simple and generous gesture that has 
stayed with me since that time.  It was indicative of the type of person Judge Cooke was—
selfless and generous.  I still have the course book in my reference library.”). 
62 Bonventre, supra note 49, at 2. 
63 Letter from Richard Baum, Esq., to Jay Carlisle, II, Professor of Law, Pace Law Sch. 
(Aug. 16, 2012) (on file with author) (“He was a very scholarly [and] honorable man.  He truly 
believed in ethics and the honor and value of our profession.”). 
64 Robert B. McKay, Six Short Years of Meritorious Service as Chief Judge, 53 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 151, 152 (1984). 
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defendants and 673,685 appearances to handle misdemeanors.65  In 
1983, New York State handled more than 2,300,000 actions and 
proceedings, and approximately 2,400,000 dispositions.66 
Chief Judge Cooke found that the organization of the New York 
court system was “a nightmare for court managers, [an] 
inconvenience to judges, and much expense to the taxpayer.  Most 
importantly, the senseless hodgepodge is inefficient and causes 
court delay.” 67  Chief Judge Cooke also found that the instability of 
the court led to sentencing disparities throughout the state, 
including disparate sanctions,68 divergent outcomes,69 and 
controlling feudal “duchies.”70  He saw “that complacency and 
indifference had undermined the effectiveness and fairness of the 
state judicial system.”71  The large backlog of cases, the judges 
coming to work late and leaving early, and the discrimination 
against women and minorities in the courthouses were cries for help 
from the judicial system that Chief Judge Cooke answered with 
hard-hitting reforms.72 
Chief Judge Cooke believed that a strong central administration 
with uniform rules would provide the proper structure for an 
effective court system.  He expressed: 
[T]he administrative function involves management of the 
court system—equipping a court with all that is necessary 
and helpful that it might perform its acts of adjudication 
well. . . . It is not an arbitrary . . . exercise; rather it is use of 
power authorized by the people to make courts more efficient 
in satisfying society’s needs.73 
In 1981, Chief Judge Cooke proposed a judicial rotation plan, 
which would be “a concerted movement designed to achieve 
improvement in the judicial structures and methods.”74  Using 
section 26 and section 28 of Article VI of the New York State 
 
65 Nicolas Pileggi, Judges at War, NEW YORKER, Apr. 19, 1982, at 19. 
66 McKay, supra note 64, at 152. 
67 Lawrence H. Cooke, Structural Reform of the Judicial System, in NEW YORK STATE 
TODAY: POLITICS, GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC POLICY 161, 167 (Peter W. Colby ed., 1985). 
68 See Cooke, supra note 11, at 245. 
69 See id.  
70 Cooke, supra note 67, at 163. 
71 Sullivan County Historical Society History Maker Award 1998: The Hon. Lawrence H. 
Cooke, SULLIVAN COUNTY HIST. SOC’Y (June 1, 1998), http://www.sullivancountyhisto 
ry.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=61:lawrence-h-cooke&catid=47:histor 
y-makers&Itemid=59 [hereinafter Sullivan County Award]. 
72 See Vincent Martin Bonventre, Tribute to Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke 1914-2000, 64 
ALB. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000). 
73 Cooke, supra note 67, at 168. 
74 Id. at 162. 
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Constitution (the “Administration Supervision of the Courts”), Chief 
Judge Cooke designed a judicial rotation plan that assigned lower 
court judges as temporary judges in supreme court throughout New 
York.75  He believed that the availability of more judges would 
alleviate the pressure of everyday court business and balance the 
workload.76 
In addition, Chief Judge Cooke announced that a new two-step 
system would be instituted, requiring “all New York City Civil and 
Criminal Court Judges . . . to be screened by a select committee . . . 
to determine their qualification to sit as acting supreme court 
justices.”77  Following the screening, “assignment to the higher 
judicial posts would be made on a rotation basis from the lower 
court judges recommended by the committee.”78 
On September 21, 1981, the Office of Court Administration 
announced that a new plan for the operation of the temporary 
assignment to supreme court would be forthcoming in New York 
City.79  In January 1982, Chief Judge Cooke’s plan went into effect, 
and it initially faced criticism.  Many critics felt that the reforms 
implemented by Cooke were an extreme abuse of power, working to 
reduce the judiciary’s independence and undermine the 
appointment of qualified judges.80 
On January 14, 1982, New York City District Attorney Robert 
Morgenthau challenged Cooke’s plan and moved to enjoin him from 
making any temporary judicial assignments to New York City’s 
Supreme Court.  Chief Judge Cooke defended his position, stating: 
The citizens have voted and made up their minds.  They 
chose central administration and continue to support it.  The 
mandate is clear.  The People want effective leadership.  The 
People want modern methods and techniques and were not 
satisfied with the way things were.  They want speedy trials. 
. . . They don’t want one single case adjourned 113 times, or 
the average number of appearances per criminal case in New 
York City to be 15.2 times.81 
The supreme court dismissed Morgenthau’s claim that 
 
75 See Morgenthau v. Cooke, 436 N.E.2d 467, 468 (N.Y. 1982). 
76 See Cooke, supra note 67, at 164−65. 
77 Morgenthau, 436 N.E.2d at 468. 
78 Id. 
79 See id.  
80 See Marcia Chamber, Bar Criticizes Plans to Rotate Acting Justices, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 
1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/08/nyregion/bar-criticizes-plans-to-rotate-acting-justic 
es.html. 
81 Cooke, supra note 67, at 168.  
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administrative regulations had not been followed by Chief Judge 
Cooke in making temporary assignments.82  The court noted that 
the “respondent [Cooke] possessed the requisite authority to place 
[his] announced plan into operation.”83 
Thereafter, Morgenthau successfully appealed the decision.84  The 
appellate division ruled that the Chief Judge could not arbitrarily 
truncate certain administrative policies regulating temporary 
assignments.85  The court held that “there was no compliance 
therewith prior to promulgation of the plan or at any time, and 
therefore that plan of temporary assignment is without effect and 
void in respect of the manner of promulgation.”86  The court 
observed: “The history of constitutional enactments in America 
teaches that every grant of power should ideally be hedged about by 
checks and balances to protect the body politic from absolute 
power.”87  Thus, the court required that Cooke’s plan be adopted 
only after proper protocol, in which the Chief Judge, the 
Administrative Board of the Courts, and the Court of Appeals, agree 
and approve.88 
Thereafter, Chief Judge Cooke appealed the appellate division’s 
decision to the New York Court of Appeals, but was unsuccessful in 
obtaining a favorable outcome.89  Despite his unsuccessful appeal, 
Chief Judge Cooke’s envisioned reformation of the judiciary was 
still influential.  While the Court of Appeals may have rebuked the 
Chief for not following the proper procedures to implement reform, 
they did not hold the procedures he proposed substantively 
unconstitutional.90  Instead, the court boosted the morale of 
reformers and implicitly promoted their cause to seek change by 
outlining the process needed for the proposed reform to be 
enacted.91 
Following the Morgenthau case, Chief Judge Cooke continued his 
efforts to push reforms that would improve the judiciary and expand 
 
82 Morgenthau ex rel People v. Cooke, 448 N.Y.S.2d 480, 482 (App. Div. 1982). 
83 Id. 
84 See id. at 481−82. 
85 Id. at 486 (“[T]he new rotation plan of temporary assignment of judges of the courts of 
the City of New York requires, as prerequisite to promulgation, the adoption of a standard 
and administrative policy in respect of the same, as well as consultation theretofore by the 
Chief Judge with the Administrative Board of the Courts and approval by the Court of 
Appeals[.]”). 
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 484. 
88 See id. at 486. 
89 See Morgenthau v. Cooke, 436 N.E.2d 467, 476 (N.Y. 1982). 
90 See id. 
91 See id. 
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“the areas of personal freedom and offered protection to those too 
powerless to defend themselves.”92  He pushed for openness, 
fairness, and efficiency within the court, noting that a Chief Judge 
must be “somebody who will never forget that the courts belong to 
the people . . . [and] who will be anxious to improve the court 
system.”93  
Chief Judge Cooke created equal opportunity offices to prevent 
discrimination against women and minorities in the staffing of the 
judicial system, as well as a Court Facilities Task Force that 
assessed the conditions of the courthouses and instituted the use of 
computers to facilitate recordkeeping.94  By the time Chief Judge 
Cooke left office in 1984, the New York State court system had the 
most advanced computer technology in the country.95  Chief Judge 
Cooke was able to establish uniform court hours and vacations that 
provided efficient time management for court personnel.96  He 
transferred more than two hundred upstate judges who had lighter 
workloads to New York City.97  Further, he was able to bring in 
retired judges to aid in ruling on pretrial criminal motions, and he 
established arbitration panels and community dispute resolution 
centers to help resolve civil disputes.98  Under Chief Judge Cooke’s 
leadership, the court system stabilized.99  His reforms resulted in a 
twenty-one percent reduction in the backlog of cases,100 and he 
continued to quell the backlogs over time—disposing of 2.4 million 
cases in 1983 alone.101 
Chief Judge Cooke also worked tirelessly with Judge Herbert B. 
Evans and Judge Robert J. Sise, both of whom were chief 
administrative judges for the Office of Court Administration, “to put 
in place other judicial administration reforms.”102  Together, they 
implemented: 
[M]erit screening[s] of criminal and civil court judges in New 
York City for temporary designation as acting supreme court 
 
92 Sullivan County Award, supra note 71. 
93 Geoffrey Taylor, Chief Judge Reforms Huge State Court System, POUGHKEEPSIE J., July 
11, 1984, at 6. 
94 See, e.g., Kane et al., supra note 4, at 47. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 A Tribute to Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994). 
98 See W. Ward Reynoldson, To Chief Judge Cooke: Leader in Innovative Judicial 
Administration, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 150 (1984). 
99 See McKay, supra note 64, at 152. 
100 A Tribute to Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, supra note 97, at 3. 
101 McKay, supra note 64, at 152. 
102 Id. 
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justices; . . . reform[s] of the sheriff’s jury panel; utilization of 
retired judges; significant improvement and broadening of 
judicial education; and establishment of the nation’s first 
state-court supervised mediation program.103 
Remarkably, Chief Judge Cooke’s quest for court reform remained 
with his successors after his retirement.  His longtime friend, 
neighbor, and distinguished colleague, Chief Judge Judith Kaye, 
followed Chief Judge Cooke’s promotion of court reform.  In a 
symposium, entitled: “Judges on Judges: The New York State Court 
of Appeals Judges’ Own Favorites in Court History,” Judge Kaye 
chose to honor Chief Judge Cooke because of his efforts “[c]omitted   
. . . to fairness in life[] and . . . jurisprudence.”104 
IV.  REPRESENTATIVE OPINIONS 
A.  Criminal Law and Procedure 
Chief Judge Cooke wrote many leading opinions on criminal law 
and procedure as both Chief Judge and associate judge for the New 
York Court of Appeals.105  He was a zealous advocate of state 
constitutionalism and was committed to protecting New York’s 
judicial independence.106  His judicial opinions sought to ensure 
judicial independence in the wake of an encroaching federal 
system.107  Of significance, Chief Judge Cooke ensured that the 
protections afforded to criminal defendants under New York’s 
Constitution would stand independent of those provided by the 
United States Constitution.108 
 
103 Id.; see also Sullivan County Award, supra note 71 (“There was increased reliance on 
mediation and arbitration to cut down on the number of court cases and judges who had to 
retire because of age were enabled to continue service to the state as hearing officers.”) 
(“Sheriff juries, notorious for allowing people with ‘clout’ to avoid jury service, were done 
away with to increase the pool of potential jurors.  A management program was instituted to 
secure better treatment of jurors.”).  
104 Judith S. Kaye, Judges on Judges: The New York State Court of Appeals Judges’ Own 
Favorites in Court History: Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, 71 ALB. L. REV. 1055, 1057 
(2008). 
105 See A Dedication to Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, supra note 25, at 154. 
106 See, e.g., id. at 155. 
107 See id. 
108 See, e.g., People v. Skinner, 417 N.E.2d 501, 502 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that a defendant’s 
statements should be suppressed, despite a valid Miranda warning and subsequent waiver, 
when the waiver was derived by police in a noncustodial interview of the defendant who 
obtained counsel specifically on the matter under investigation and whose lawyer had 
instructed the police not to question the defendant in his absence); People v. Cunningham, 
400 N.E.2d 360, 361 (N.Y. 1980) (“[O]nce a suspect in custody requests the assistance of 
counsel, he may not be questioned further in the absence of an attorney. . . . [A]n uncounseled 
waiver of a constitutional right will not be deemed voluntary if it is made after the right to 
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In addition, Chief Judge Cooke’s opinions were consistent and 
evenhanded.109  He remained steadfast in his commitment to 
protecting core principles, noting: “A defendant charged with the 
most heinous of crimes is still entitled to the fundamental fairness 
we conceive under the notion of due process.”110  He routinely 
directed that overreaching government activity was not to be 
tolerated, because “if not checked, [it was] certain to encourage 
lawlessness and destroy cherished freedoms.”111 
On several occasions, Chief Judge Cooke authored decisions 
directing that a criminal defendant’s conviction be overturned based 
upon a finding that the trial proceeding was unfair.  For instance, in 
People v. Whalen,112 the defendant was convicted of rape in the first 
degree following a jury trial, at which he “proceeded on a ‘mistaken 
identification’ defense, and sought to establish an alibi.”113  Chief 
Judge Cooke reversed the defendant’s conviction as a result of the 
prosecution’s improper conduct during its summation, where the 
prosecutor had impermissibly sought to undermine the defendant’s 
alibi evidence by characterizing it as a concoction that was recently 
fabricated to ruse the jury.114  The prosecutor also misrepresented to 
the jury that no notice of the defendant’s alibi was ever received by 
the prosecution before trial, although the defendant had properly 
served the prosecutor with notice of his alibi defense eight months 
beforehand.115 
Chief Judge Cooke observed that the prosecutor not only violated 
ethical mandates when falsely representing what had occurred 
regarding the defendant’s alibi notice, but also that the prosecutor’s 
action “in itself violated the [Government’s] obligation to seek 
justice, rather than conviction.”116  Chief Judge Cooke explained 
 
counsel has been invoked.”); People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 613 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that 
identification of a criminal defendant made during a pre-arraignment corporeal viewing 
should have been excluded where the defendant, in absence of counsel but after receipt of 
Miranda warnings, orally waived his right to have an attorney present at the lineup). 
109 See, e.g., People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 85 (N.Y. 1978) (“No matter what the 
defendant’s past record and present inclinations to criminality, or the depths to which he has 
sunk in the estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is 
not to be tolerated by an advanced society.” (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 
382–83 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))). 
110 Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d at 85. 
111 Id.; see also id. at 84 (“[The] court would be paying mere lip service to the principle of 
due process if it sanctioned the continuance of a prosecution in the face of [improper and 
reprehensible police conduct].”). 
112 People v. Whalen, 451 N.E.2d 212 (N.Y. 1983). 
113 Id. at 213.  
114 Id. at 214. 
115 Id. at 213, 215.  
116 Id. at 215. 
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that the prosecutor “made himself a witness before the jury, 
expressly and falsely denying that notice had been given.”117  He 
concluded that such behavior “was completely unjustified, going far 
beyond any bounds of proper advocacy[,]”118 and that “[t]he 
prosecutor’s conduct during summation was [so] improper and 
prejudicial to defendant”119 that a new trial was required in the 
interest of justice.120 
In People v. Blyden,121 Chief Judge Cooke also decided that a new 
trial was warranted when the trial court had denied a defendant’s 
for-cause challenge on a juror who voiced hostility to racial 
minorities during voir dire.122  He explained that the juror’s general 
statements, claiming that he could put aside his feelings and 
remain impartial towards the defendant, were insufficient to ensure 
that defendant received a fair trial.123  Chief Judge Cooke observed: 
“The costs to society and the criminal justice system of discharging 
the juror are comparatively slight, while the costs in fairness to the 
defendant and the general perception of fairness of not discharging 
such a juror are great.”124  He emphasized that a juror must convey 
an absolute ability to render an impartial verdict, and a “hollow 
incantation, made without assurance or certitude, is not enough.”125  
He explained: “Where there remain[ed] . . . doubt in the wake of 
such statements, when considered in the context of the juror’s over-
all responses, the prospective juror should be discharged for 
cause.”126  Chief Judge Cooke emphasized that a court cannot 
simply turn away from a juror’s “hostility to racial minorities that 
cast serious doubt on his ability to render an impartial verdict,” 
especially when someone’s life and liberty are at stake.127 
 
117 Id. at 215–16. 
118 Id. at 216. 
119 Id. at 215. 
120 See id. at 216.  
121 People v. Blyden, 432 N.E.2d 758 (N.Y. 1982).  
122 Id. at 758.  Chief Judge Cooke noted: 
In determining whether the trial court erred in refusing to discharge the challenged 
juror for cause, it is necessary to look first to CPL 270.20 (subd 1, par [b]), which 
authorizes a challenge for cause where the juror “has a state of mind that is likely to 
preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at 
the trial.” 
Id. at 759. 
123 See id. at 760–61. 
124 Id. at 760. 
125 Id.  
126 Id.  
127 See id. at 761. 
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B.  Due Process Clause of The New York State Constitution  
Chief Judge Cooke emphasized the court system’s duty to address 
due process claims under the New York Constitution.128  He sought 
to utilize New York’s Constitution in order to expand upon rights 
afforded to both criminal defendants and civil litigants under the 
U.S. Constitution.129  Chief Judge Cooke’s rulings have influenced 
the decisions of his court successors, as explained in further detail 
below.130 
Chief Judge Cooke advanced the development of New York’s due 
process clause when the court decided People v. Isaacson, a case in 
which the police facilitated the cooperation of an informant by 
physical abuse and deception.131  The police also instructed the 
informant to request that the defendant bring drugs into New York 
by claiming that the informant desperately needed money as a 
result of financial difficulties.132  The informant was also instructed 
to tell the defendant to bring more than one ounce of cocaine.133 
Chief Judge Cooke reversed the defendant’s conviction, finding 
that the police’s conduct was not tenable in a system 
constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process.  Chief 
Judge Cooke constructed a four-factor test in addressing claims 
involving such police misconduct: 
(1) [W]hether the police manufactured a crime which 
otherwise would not likely have occurred, or merely involved 
themselves in an ongoing criminal activity; (2) whether the 
police themselves engaged in criminal or improper conduct 
repugnant to a sense of justice; (3) whether the defendant’s 
reluctance to commit the crime is overcome by appeals to 
humanitarian instincts such as sympathy or past friendship, 
by temptation of exorbitant gain, or by persistent solicitation 
 
128 See People v. Gokey, 457 N.E.2d 723, 724–25 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that the New York 
State Constitution affords individuals a greater right of privacy than does the United States 
Constitution). 
129 See, e.g., People v. Ferber, 441 N.E.2d 1100, 1101 (N.Y. 1982). 
130 See, e.g., People v. Davis, 553 N.E.2d 1008, 1010–11 (N.Y. 1990) (“In New York, the 
right to counsel is grounded on this state’s constitutional and statutory guarantees of the 
privilege against self-incrimination, [and] the right to the assistance of counsel and due 
process of law. . . . It extends well beyond the right to counsel afforded by the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and other state Constitutions.”).  
131 People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 80, 81 (N.Y. 1978).  The police had beaten and 
deceived its informant into thinking that he was facing a stiff prison sentence, which caused 
him to seek out the defendant.  Id. at 81. 
132 See id. at 80 (showing that the court found that police instructed the informant to tell 
the defendant he was in trouble with the police and needed money to secure a lawyer). 
133 See id. 
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in the face of unwillingness; and (4) whether the record 
reveals simply a desire to obtain a conviction with no reading 
that the police motive is to prevent further crime or protect 
the populace.134 
Under this approach, Chief Judge Cooke found that the facts in 
Isaacson: 
[E]xposes the ugliness of police brutality, upon which was 
imposed a cunning subterfuge employed to enlist the services 
of an informant who, deceived into thinking he was facing a 
stiff prison sentence, desperately sought out any individual 
he could to satisfy the police thirst for a conviction, even of a 
resident of another state possessed of no intention to enter 
our confines.135 
Chief Judge Cooke directed that “[n]o matter what the 
defendant’s past record and present inclinations to criminality, or 
the depths to which he has sunk in the estimation of society, certain 
police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be 
tolerated by an advanced society.”136  He further held that the police 
actions were so outrageous that a dismissal of the indictment was 
warranted.137  In doing so, Chief Judge Cooke commanded that the 
state’s due process clause guarantee respect for personal 
immunities that were “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of 
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”138  Chief Judge Cooke 
observed that he had a duty to foster “fundamental fairness . . . to 
the very concept of justice,”139 and that the “court would be paying 
mere lip service to the principle of due process if it sanctioned the 
continuance of a prosecution in the face of the revelations of this 
record.”140  Many other courts in the United States, including the 
supreme courts of Florida and Minnesota, adopted the Chief Judge’s 
four-factor approach in Isaacson when faced with similar 
allegations of outrageous government conduct.141  
 
134 See id. at 83. 
135 See id. at 84. 
136 See id. at 85.  Chief Judge Cooke further expressed:  
Those who fear that dismissal of convictions on due process grounds may portend an 
unmanageable subjectivity.  Such apprehension is unjustified for courts by their very 
nature are constantly called upon to make judgments and, though differences of opinion 
often surround human institutions, this is the nature of the judicial process. 
Id.  
137 Id. at 85. 
138 Id. at 82 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). 
139 Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d at 82 (quoting People v. Leyra, 98 N.E.2d 553, 559 (1997)). 
140 Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d at 84. 
141 See, e.g., State v. Hunter, 586 So. 2d 319, 326 (Fla. 1991) (“[T]he majority opinion 
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In People ex rel. McGee v. Walters,142 Chief Judge Cooke also 
found that the due process clause of the New York State 
Constitution mandates that the accused be allowed to confront 
adverse witnesses in parole hearings.143  Cooke observed that a 
parolee must be extended the same amenities as other citizens 
when seeking to impeach adverse statements offered at a parole 
revocation hearing, and such due process protections should not be 
narrowly tailored based upon the adversarial setting.144  He 
explained that “[a]ny determination that dispenses with the need 
for confrontation requires consideration of the rights’ favored 
status, the nature of the evidence at issue, the potential utility of 
cross-examination in the fact-finding process, and the state’s burden 
in being required to produce the declarant.”145 
Twenty-seven years later, New York courts continued to follow 
the Chief Judge’s rationale.  In 2011, the New York Appellate 
Division, Second Department, relied extensively upon his decision 
in McGee, holding that a parolee’s due process rights were violated 
when he was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine his 
parole officer, who prepared a report and possessed personal 
knowledge of the alleged violations, during his revocation 
hearing.146  The appellate division reaffirmed Chief Judge Cooke’s 
finding that “a parolee has due process and statutory rights to 
confront adverse witnesses whose statements are offered at a parole 
 
issued today is in general harmony with the principles announced by the New York court.  
Clearly, Florida’s own due process, objective entrapment defense would prohibit similar 
conduct on the part of police and their informants in this state.”); State v. Jensen, No. T9-02-
4518, 2004 WL 193133, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (“When a defendant raises a due[ ]process 
issue on appeal relating to a drug crime, this court applies the four-factor test in People v. 
Isaacson.”); State v. Theis, No. Co-93-1990, 1994 WL 396359, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (“In 
making this determination of [police] outrageousness, this court depends on People v. 
Isaacson.”).   
142 People ex rel. McGee v. Walters, 465 N.E.2d 342 (N.Y. 1984). 
143 See id. at 343.  In People ex rel. McGee, Chief Judge Cooke affirmed the lower court’s 
decision that found that an impingement upon a parolee’s right to cross-examine the author 
of status reports was violative of his due process rights, and such a violation could not be 
excused by entering the report as a business record.  See id. at 343–44; see also Isaacson, 378 
N.E.2d at 82 (“‘[D]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a 
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.  It embraces fundamental rights 
and immutable principles of justice and use of the term is but another way of saying that 
every person’s right to life, liberty and property is to be accorded the shield of inherent and 
fundamental principles of justice.”).  
144 See Walters, 65 N.E.2d at 343. 
145 Id.  
146 See People ex rel. Rosenfield v. Sposato, 928 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351–52 (App. Div.  2011).  In 
Sposato, the court granted a writ of habeas corpus, finding that the petitioner’s due process 
rights were violated when he was afforded no opportunity to cross-examine a parole officer 
who prepared a report and who possessed personal knowledge of the alleged violations during 
his parole hearing.  
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revocation hearing.”147 
Furthermore, in Matter of Quinton A.,148 Chief Judge Cooke 
addressed legislative enactments that provided mandatory 
placements on juvenile offenders under the state’s due process 
clause.149  The petitioner, a juvenile delinquent, argued that the 
mandatory nature of his restrictive placement denied him due 
process and equal protection of the law.150  Specifically, the 
defendant challenged sections 743, 746, and 753 of the Family 
Court Act, which allowed restrictive placements for those juveniles 
found to have committed a designated felony act.151  Chief Judge 
Cooke rejected the defendant’s claim that mandatory placement in 
itself was unconstitutional, noting that “[t]he essence of procedural 
due process is that a person must be afforded notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before government may deprive him of 
liberty or a recognized property interest.”152  Chief Judge Cooke 
recognized that “restrictive placement is a deprivation of liberty 
which the state may not accomplish without first affording 
appellant due process of law.”153  However, he explained that 
“[s]ince family court may not order restrictive placement until after 
it affords a juvenile a statutorily required dispositional hearing on 
notice, the statute fully comport[ed] with procedural due process 
strictures.”154 
 
147 Id. (quoting Walters, 465 N.E.2d at 343). 
148 In re Quinton A., 402 N.E.2d 126 (N.Y. 1980). 
149 See id. at 129.  In Matter of Quinton A., the petitioner was a juvenile delinquent who 
was found to have committed acts, which if committed by an adult, would have constituted 
felony crimes.  Id.  On appeal, the petitioner maintained that the mandatory nature of his 
restrictive placement denied him due process and equal protection of the law.  Id.  Chief 
Judge Cooke reversed and remitted the matter for a new hearing, holding that the Family 
Court Act “which provides for mandatory restrictive placement of the state’s most violent 
juvenile offenders, is constitutional.”  Id. at 128.  However, the court concluded that it was 
reversible error for the family court to admit inculpating statements made by petitioner and 
his alleged accomplice expressly stating that the accomplice’s detailed statement could be 
used to supply critical details absent from petitioner’s statement.  See id. at 132. 
150 See id. at 129. 
151 Id. at 130 n.1.   
152 Id.  Nevertheless, Chief Judge Cooke remanded the matter for a new hearing.  He 
concluded that it was error for the family court to have admitted certain inculpating 
statements.  See id. at 132. 
153 Id. at 130. 
154 Id. at 130 n.1.  Chief Judge Cooke noted: 
[R]estrictive placement is a deprivation of liberty which the state may not accomplish 
without first affording appellant due process of law.  But given a finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that appellant committed acts which would have been felonious if 
committed by an adult, appellant’s liberty interest has been diminished to the point 
where utilization of a rehabilitative program requiring restrictive placement is not 
violative of due process unless the selection of that program lacks a rational basis or its 
application constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  Thus, the notion that, in the 
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Chief Judge Cooke also rendered significant opinions relating to 
property rights under the due process clause of the New York State 
Constitution.155  He issued a seminal opinion in Sharrock v. Dell 
Buick-Cadillac, holding that sections of New York’s Lien Law, 
which authorized a garageman to foreclose his possessory lien for 
repairs and storage charges, were violative of New York’s 
Constitution.156  Chief Judge Cooke commanded that the state’s due 
process clause required that a person be given notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before the state can allow the deprivation of 
a significant property interest.157  He observed that “‘when no more 
than private gain is directly at stake,’ the opportunity to be heard is 
an indispensable bulwark against an arbitrary, and final, 
deprivation of property.”158  He declared that the purpose of the due 
process clause in the New York Constitution is to ensure that: 
[N]o member of the state [is] disfranchised, or deprived of 
any of his rights and privileges, unless the matter be 
adjudged against him upon trial and according to the course 
of the common law.  It must be ascertained judicially that he 
has forfeited his privileges, or that some one [sic] else has a 
superior title to the property he possesses, before either of 
them can be taken from him.159 
Chief Judge Cooke rested his decision solely upon the due process 
clause of the New York State Constitution, given that the federal 
Constitution did not require such protections.160  He observed that 
the “historical differences between the federal and state due process 
clauses make clear that they were adopted to combat entirely 
different evils.”161  He explained that prior to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the federal due process clause offered “virtually no 
protections of individual liberties,” while “state Constitutions in 
general, and the New York Constitution in particular, have long 
safeguarded any threat to individual liberties.”162  He noted that 
 
post[-]adjudicative stage, therapeutic treatment in the least restrictive setting is the 
cornerstone for an adjudication of juvenile delinquency is rejected. 
Id. at 130 (internal citations omitted). 
155 See, e.g., Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1178 (N.Y. 1978). 
156 See id. at 1171, 1177–78. 
157 Id. at 1176. 
158 Id. at 1178 (holding that sections of New York’s Lien Law, which authorized a 
garageman to foreclose his possessory lien for repairs and storage charges, violated New 
York’s Constitution).  
159 Id. at 1174. 
160 See id. at 1173 n.2.  
161 Id. at 1174. 
162 Id.; see also People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 615 (N.Y. 1978) (expressing that the New 
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“independent construction finds its genesis specifically in the 
unique language of the due process clause of the New York 
Constitution, as well as the long history of due process protections 
afforded the citizens of this state and, more generally, in 
fundamental principles of federalism.”163 
Chief Judge Cooke explained the inherent differences between the 
due process clause of the federal Constitution and the due process 
clause in New York’s Constitution, noting: “Conspicuously absent 
from the state Constitution is any language requiring state action 
before an individual may find refuge in its protections.”164  He 
proposed that the absence of an expressive direction, however, was 
held not to eliminate the necessity of state involvement but “[to] 
provide a basis to apply a more flexible state involvement 
requirement than is currently being imposed by the Supreme Court 
with respect to the federal provision.”165  Chief Judge Cooke 
 
York State Constitution provided a basis for the right to counsel well before the Supreme 
Court recognized comparable rights federally); People v. Staley, 41 364 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 
(N.Y. 1977) (“[The New York courts] recognized that unreasonable delay in prosecuting a 
defendant constitutes a denial of due process of law.” (citing People v. Winfrey, 228 N.E.2d 
808, 812 (N.Y. 1967); People v. Wilson, 171 N.E.2d 310, 312–13 (N.Y. 1960))). 
163 Sharrock, 379 N.E.2d at 1173.  As a result, the Second Department held that the very 
provision of the Uniform Commercial Code that had been upheld as constitutional by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks was unconstitutional under the provisions of the New 
York State Constitution.  See Svendsen v. Smith’s Moving & Trucking Co., 431 N.Y.S.2d 94, 
95, 96 (App. Div. 1980).  The court found that the provision violated the due process clause of 
the state Constitution as it was construed and applied in Sharrock.  See id.  In rendering its 
per curiam decision, the Second Department said: “As in Sharrock . . . , the state’s 
authorization of ex parte foreclosure of the warehouseman’s lien is violative of state due 
process as it deprives debtors of a significant property interest without a prior opportunity to 
be heard.”  Id. at 96.  
164 Sharrock, 379 N.E.2d at 1173.  Chief Judge Cooke’s well-reasoned approach “did not 
leave the barn door unlocked” in the face of three dissenting judges who advanced that the 
provisions of the state and federal due process clause should be held co-extensive.  See, e.g., 
id. at 1179–80, 1181 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
165 Id. at 1174; see also People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. 1986) (“One 
basis for relying on the state Constitution arises from an interpretive review of its provisions.  
If the language of the state Constitution differs from that of its federal counterpart, then the 
court may conclude that there is a basis for a different interpretation of it.  Such an analysis 
considers whether the textual language of the state Constitution specifically recognizes rights 
not enumerated in the federal Constitution; whether language in the state Constitution is 
sufficiently unique to support a broader interpretation of the individual right under state law; 
whether the history of the adoption of the text reveals an intention to make the state 
provision coextensive with, or broader than, the parallel federal provision; and whether the 
very structure and purpose of the state Constitution serves to expressly affirm certain rights 
rather than merely restrain the sovereign power of the state.  To contrast, noninterpretive 
review proceeds from a judicial perception of sound policy, justice and fundamental fairness.  
A noninterpretive analysis attempts to discover, for example, any preexisting state statutory 
or common law defining the scope of the individual right in question; the history and 
traditions of the state in its protection of the individual right; any identification of the right in 
the state Constitution as being one of peculiar state or local concern; and any distinctive 
attitudes of the state citizenry toward the definition, scope or protection of the individual 
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explained that although certain acts may not constitute state action 
under the federal Constitution for purposes of establishing a due 
process violation, it could nevertheless constitute state action under 
the New York State Constitution.166 
Chief Judge Cooke’s opinion in Sharrock significantly impacted 
the courts’ subsequent decisions regarding state 
constitutionalism.167  For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones 
v. United States168 held that “the Eighth Amendment does not 
require that the jurors be instructed as to the consequence of their 
failure to agree.”169  Relying upon Chief Judge Cooke’s instruction in 
Sharrock, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the Supreme 
Court’s approach and reaffirmed that the due process clause of the 
New York Constitution required a higher standard of fairness than 
the federal Constitution.170  The court explained: “[O]n innumerable 
occasions this court has given [the] state Constitution an 
independent construction, affording the rights and liberties of the 
citizens of this state even more protection than may be secured 
under the United States Constitution.”171  Following this rationale, 
the court found, irrespective of the holding in Jones, that a trial 
court’s failure to give a proper deadlock instruction in the course of 
a capital proceeding violated New York’s due process clause.172 
C.  Right to Counsel 
Chief Judge Cooke wrote many significant judicial opinions 
relating to a criminal defendant’s right to counsel.  His opinions 
stressed the importance of protecting a criminal defendant’s right to 
counsel at all stages of a criminal matter, and the court’s duty to 
advance state law when questions arose concerning the nature and 
scope of the attorney-client relationship.173 
 
right.”). 
166 Sharrock, 379 N.E.2d at 1173. 
167 See, e.g., P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d at 561 (“In the past we have frequently applied 
the state Constitution, in both civil and criminal matters, to define a broader scope of 
protection than that accorded by the federal Constitution in cases concerning individual 
rights and liberties.”).  
168 Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999). 
169 Id. at 381. 
170 See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 366 (N.Y. 2004).  
171 Sharrock, 379 N.E.2d at 1173.  “[H]istorical differences between the federal and state 
due process clauses make clear that they were adopted to combat entirely different evils.”  
LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 366 (citing Sharrock, 379 N.E.2d at 1173). 
172 LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 366. 
173 See, e.g., People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 615 (N.Y. 1978) (“[S]o valued is the right to 
counsel in this state, it has developed independent of its federal counterpart.”).  
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In this context, Chief Judge Cooke routinely observed that 
protecting the right to counsel was of crucial importance to 
maintaining fundamental fairness in criminal proceedings, and he 
understood counsel’s role as an important part to balance the 
playing field in an adversarial settings in which the state is a 
party.174  In this regard, Chief Judge Cooke explained: 
[A] special solicitude for this fundamental right [to counsel] 
is based upon our belief that the presence of an attorney is 
the most effective means [the court has] of minimizing the 
disadvantage at which an accused is placed when he is 
directly confronted with the awesome law enforcement 
machinery possessed by the state.175 
Chief Judge Cooke’s opinions also established broader protections 
for a criminal defendant’s right to counsel when such individuals 
were first subjected to law enforcement questioning and requested 
to waive their right to counsel.176  He found that the protections 
offered by Miranda warnings might not always be sufficient to: 
[E]nsure that an accused will not “waive” an important 
constitutional right out of ignorance, confusion or fear, [so 
the Court has held] that, in certain situations, the right to 
counsel in New York includes the right of an accused to have 
an attorney present while he is considering whether to waive 
his rights.177 
In this context, Chief Judge Cooke found that both an explicit and 
implicit request for counsel by a defendant should not be narrowly 
construed by law enforcement.178  For example, in People v. Buxton, 
 
174 See, e.g., People v. Skinner, 417 N.E.2d 501, 503 (N.Y. 1980).  In Skinner, Chief Judge 
Cooke noted that an effective waiver of the right to counsel in the absence of a suspect’s 
attorney “simply recognizes the right and need of an individual to have a competent advocate 
at his or her side in dealing with the State.”  Id. 
175 People v. Cunningham, 400 N.E.2d 360, 363 (N.Y. 1980). 
176 See, e.g., People v. Buxton, 374 N.E.2d 384, 387 (N.Y. 1978).  In Buxton, Chief Judge 
Cooke focused on the period of time that lapsed from the point in which the defendant was 
apprehended and when the police sought a waiver from the defendant.  Because the 
defendant requested counsel “at the time of his arrest,” the court held that upon returning to 
police headquarters, “the police may not immediately and actively seek a waiver of this right 
and then proceed to interrogate [a defendant] in the absence of counsel.”  Id.  
177 Cunningham, 400 N.E.2d at 363.  
178 People v. Kazmarick, 420 N.E.2d 45, 50 (N.Y. 1981) (Cooke, J., dissenting) 
(“[C]ommencement of the criminal proceeding is the equivalent of actual representation by 
counsel . . . [and] ‘where an indictment has been returned, [the court] equate[s] the indictment 
with the entry of a lawyer into the proceedings and invoke[s] the requirement of counsel’s 
presence to effectuate a valid waiver.’”); Settles, 385 N.E.2d at 617 (“The right to counsel is 
not dependent upon the speed with which an attorney can be retained nor does it pivot on the 
length of police delay in arraigning an indigent defendant so that counsel may be 
appointed.”). 
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Cooke demanded that a defendant’s indirect request for counsel was 
sufficient to require counsel’s presence during police questioning.179  
Chief Judge Cooke rejected the state’s contention that a “specific 
and clear request to interrogating officers that [the] defendant did 
not wish to speak with them” was required for the attachment of 
counsel.180  He expressed that such a narrow tailoring of one’s right 
to counsel would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights181 and 
pervert the notion of fundamental fairness.182 
In People v. Rogers, Chief Judge Cooke also found that law 
enforcement officials may not purposely disregard counsel’s 
“instruct[ion] . . . to cease further questioning,” even if counsel is 
retained by the defendant on an unrelated charge.183  He expressed 
 
179 See, e.g., Buxton, 374 N.E.2d at 386–87.  In Buxton, the defendant had requested that a 
third party obtain a lawyer for him while police apprehended him from his place of 
employment.  Id. at 386.  The defendant was taken to police headquarters where he was read 
his Miranda rights and notified of the charges brought against him.  Id.  The defendant was 
held in police custody for approximately two hours before witnesses were brought to the 
station to view the defendant, during which time he repeatedly requested assistance of 
counsel.  Id.  Subsequently, the defendant was questioned by the police and offered 
statements regarding the crimes with which he was charged.  Id.  The state argued that 
because the request was made to a third party, it was not a sufficiently “specific and clear 
request to interrogating officers that [the] defendant did not wish to speak with them until he 
had consulted with an attorney.”  Id.; see also People v. Bevilacqua, 382 N.E.2d 1326, 1329 
(N.Y. 1978) (concluding that a violation of the right to counsel occurred in light of a bad-faith 
failure by police to notify the mother of an eighteen-year-old suspect who requested her 
mom’s assistance, and subsequently concealed the defendant’s location from her and the 
attorney she retained). 
180 Buxton, 374 N.E.2d at 386.  The court noted that “it would be an absurd formality” to 
conclude that the defendant’s request for representation was not valid because although 
made in the presence of the police, the request was directed at a third-party.  Id. 
181 Id. at 386–87.  Chief Judge Cooke noted that a statement “freely and voluntarily” given 
by the defendant to the police “without any compelling influence is . . . admissible in 
evidence.”  Id. at 387.  However, a defendant, after asserting the right to remain silent, may 
subsequently be questioned and those statements admitted into evidence as long as 
additional Miranda warnings are given and “the subsequent statement is not the product of 
‘continued importunity or coercive interrogation in the guise of a request for reconsideration.’”  
Id. (quoting People v. Gary, 286 N.E.2d 263, 264 (N.Y. 1972)).  Although a defendant’s specific 
request for counsel renders further police interrogation improper, a statement made by the 
defendant may nonetheless be admitted in evidence if the statement is “a spontaneous 
admission or [the defendant] simply change[s] his mind and voluntarily make[s] a statement.” 
Buxton, 374 N.E.2d at 387. 
182 See Buxton, 374 N.E.2d at 386. 
183 People v. Rogers, 397 N.E.2d 709, 711, 713 (N.Y. 1979).  In Rogers, the defendant was 
taken to police headquarters upon an arrest for a robbery.  Id. at 711.  During his arrest, the 
defendant was twice read his Miranda rights—once at the time of arrest and again prior to 
questioning at the police station.  Id.  During custodial questioning, the defendant alerted the 
police that he was represented by counsel, but agreed to interrogation without his attorney 
present.  Id.  At this time, the defendant’s attorney had contacted police headquarters and 
demanded that the questioning of his client cease.  Id.  Ignoring this request, the officers 
continued the interrogation, claiming that the defendant waived his right to have counsel 
present.  Id. 
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that a waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel in the absence of 
his attorney is not a constitutionally valid waiver,184 and the state’s 
failure to adhere to this approach would present severe 
ramifications.185 
In Rogers, the defendant had been taken to police headquarters 
after being arrested for robbery.186  At the time of his arrest, the 
defendant was twice read his Miranda rights.187  During custodial 
questioning, the defendant alerted the police that he was 
represented by counsel, but agreed to interrogation without his 
attorney present.188  At this time, the defendant’s attorney had 
contacted police headquarters asking that the defendant not be 
questioned.189  The officers ignored counsel’s request, and continued 
the interrogation, asking about unrelated activities, relying upon 
the defendant’s prior waiver.190   
Chief Judge Cooke rejected the government’s contention that the 
defendant’s waiver was sufficient.191  He explained that “it is the 
role of defendant’s attorney, not the state, to determine whether a 
particular matter will or will not touch upon the extant charge.”192  
He also emphasized: 
[I]t would be to ignore reality to deny the role of counsel 
when the particular episode of questioning does not concern 
the pending charge[, and it] cannot be assumed that an 
attorney would abandon his client merely because the police 
represent that they seek to question on a matter unrelated to 
the charge on which the attorney has been retained or 
assigned.193 
Chief Judge Cooke’s opinion in Rogers has remained influential 
and is controlling authority.194  For over three decades, “[it] has 
 
184 See id. at 713. 
185 See id. at 710–11 (noting that a violation of counsel’s command to police that 
questioning cease could lead to an exclusion of statements and/or a new trial if improperly 
admitted). 
186 See id. at 711. 
187 See id. 
188 See id.  
189 See id. 
190 See id. 
191 See id. at 711–12.  
192 Id. at 713; People v. Lopez, 947 N.E.2d 1155, 1160 (N.Y. 2011) (“The Rogers rule is 
eminently straightforward: when an attorney undertakes representation in a matter for 
which the defendant is in custody, all questioning is barred unless the police obtain a 
counseled waiver.  Rogers therefore requires inquiry on three objectively verifiable 
elements—custody, representation[,] and entry.”). 
193 Rogers, 397 N.E.2d at 713.  
194 See Lopez, 947 N.E.2d at 1158–59.  
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stood as a workable, comprehensible, bright line rule, providing 
effective guidance to law enforcement while ensuring that it is 
defendant’s attorney, not the police, who determines which matters 
are related and unrelated to the subject of the representation.”195  
To date, the courts have expressed the utmost praise for Chief 
Judge Cooke’s approach in Rogers,196 and have continuously 
disapproved of any attempt to undercut its application.197  In 2011, 
the New York Court of Appeals continued to expressively adopt the 
holding of Rogers.198 
Chief Judge Cooke also held in People v. Settles that “[t]he filing 
of an indictment constitutes the commencement of a formal judicial 
action against the defendant and is equated with the entry of an 
attorney into the proceeding.”199  In Settles, the police had issued a 
 
195 Id. at 1160 (citing People v. Burdo, 690 N.E.2d 854, 856 (N.Y. 1997)).  In Lopez, the 
police interrogated the defendant relating to a murder case while he was already incarcerated 
in Pennsylvania on other charges, upon which counsel was attained.  See Lopez, 947 N.E.2d 
at 1157.  An informant had told the New York police that the defendant was involved in the 
robbery and was the individual who shot the victim.  See id. at 1156.  Acting on this tip, a 
New York police officer visited the defendant at the Pennsylvania prison to continue the 
investigation.  Id. at 1157.  Upon arrival at the prison, the detective read the defendant his 
Miranda rights, but did not inquire as to whether the defendant was represented by counsel.  
Id.  Rather than directly asking the defendant whether he had representation, the police 
officer sought to obtain the defendant’s consent to continue, asking only whether the 
defendant would like to speak with an attorney before proceeding with his interrogation.  See 
id.  During the course of questioning, the defendant confessed to being involved in the crime, 
but denied that he was the shooter.  See id.  Finding a violation of the defendant’s indelible 
right to counsel, the court relied upon the holding in Rogers, finding that “the indelible right 
to counsel activates the moment that an attorney becomes involved.”  Id. at 1159. 
196 See generally Rogers, 397 N.E.2d at 713 (showing the standard).  In this regard, New 
York’s jurisprudence “has continuously evolved with the ultimate goal of ‘achieving a balance 
between the competing interests of society in the protection of cherished individual rights, on 
the one hand, and in effective law enforcement and investigation of crime, on the other.’”  
People v. Grice, 794 N.E.2d 9, 12 (N.Y. 2003) (quoting People v. Waterman, 175 N.E.2d 445, 
447 (N.Y. 1961).  Consequently, the parameters of the indelible right to counsel are defined 
“through the adoption of ‘pragmatic and . . . simple[] test[s]’ grounded on ‘common sense and 
fairness’” in order to “provid[e] an objective measure to guide law enforcement officials and 
the courts.”  See Grice, 794 N.E.2d at 12; People v. Robles, 533 N.E.2d 240, 245 (N.Y. 1988). 
197 See, e.g., Lopez, 947 N.E.2d at 1160 (“Permitting a police officer to remain deliberately 
indifferent—avoiding any inquiry on the subject notwithstanding the nature of the custodial 
charges and the likelihood that a lawyer has entered the matter—in order to circumvent the 
protection afforded by Rogers is not only fundamentally unfair to the rights of the accused, it 
further undermines the preexisting attorney-client relationship that serves as the foundation 
of the Rogers rule.”). 
198 See id. at 1156 (holding that an interrogator—who suspects that an attorney may have 
entered the custodial matter—has an obligation to inquire regarding the defendant’s 
representational status, and the interrogator will be charged with the knowledge that such an 
inquiry likely would have revealed).  
199 People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 613–14 (N.Y. 1978) (“[A] defendant in a 
postindictment, prearraignment custodial setting, even though not then represented by an 
attorney, may not in the absence of counsel waive his right to have counsel appear at a 
corporeal identification.”).  
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warrant for the defendant’s arrest for robbery and other charges.200  
The defendant was apprehended by police in Georgia and 
transferred to New York, where he was subject to indictment.201  
New York police officers read the defendant his Miranda rights, but 
failed to inform him that he was under indictment for the 
robbery.202  After the defendant was given his rights, he agreed to 
be in a lineup and was subsequently identified by two individuals as 
the perpetrator in the charged offenses.203  Chief Judge Cooke 
observed that an official indictment against a defendant shifts “the 
character of the police function . . . from investigatory to accusatory” 
because the defendant “cannot make any arrangement with the 
police which is not subject to the ultimate approval of the court.”204  
Consequently, Miranda warnings become insufficient to “satisfy the 
higher standard with respect to a waiver of the right to counsel.”205 
In People v. Skinner, Chief Judge Cooke remained devoted to 
protecting the attorney-client privilege.206  There, the circumstances 
at issue involved the police’s pre-arrest investigation and repeated 
attempts to question the defendant regarding an unsolved 
murder.207  During the midst of these contacts, the defendant 
retained an attorney to assist in the matter.208  The attorney 
contacted the police to inform them that he was retained, and would 
handle all matters relating to the investigation as far as it dealt 
with defendant.209  Shortly thereafter, the police confronted the 
defendant, without counsel’s knowledge, to serve him with legal 
papers seeking to compel his appearance at a corporeal lineup.210  
During this contact, the defendant made damaging admissions to 
the police regarding the murder.211  Chief Judge Cooke observed 
that when an individual “obtain[s] counsel specifically on [a] matter 
 
200 See id. at 614. 
201 See id. 
202 See id. 
203 See id. 
204 Id. at 616. 
205 Id. at 616, 617 (“[N]o knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel may be said to have 
occurred without the essential presence of counsel.”).  Moreover, the court noted that 
“assistance of counsel after indictment at a lineup is an indispensable correlative to a fair 
trial.  Nice distinctions between the need for counsel at various stages of the proceedings are 
irrelevant once the right to counsel has indelibly attached.”  Id. at 617–18.  Further, “the 
[indelible] right to counsel attaches” upon defendant’s request for an attorney, or “after . . . 
arraignment . . . [or] upon the filing of an accusatory instrument.”  Id. at 615. 
206 See People v. Skinner, 417 N.E.2d 501, 502 (N.Y. 1980). 
207 See id. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. 
210 See id. 
211 See id. 
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under investigation,” the individual cannot be questioned by law 
enforcement officers “in a noncustodial setting after [counsel] . . . 
instruct[s] the police not to question [the] defendant in [counsel’s] 
absence.”212   
Although the defendant consented to questioning at police 
headquarters, Chief Judge Cooke found that the defendant’s right to 
counsel was violated because law enforcement officers knew that 
the defendant was represented in the matter under investigation 
and questioned him without counsel present.213  He explained: 
“Whether a person is in custody at the time of interrogation is not 
controlling when an attorney represents that person on the matter 
about which he or she is questioned.”214  Chief Judge Cooke 
emphasized that police actions infringing upon the central 
protections within the attorney-client relationship cannot be 
ignored.215 
In People v. Cunningham, Chief Judge Cooke also held in no 
uncertain terms that “an uncounseled waiver of a constitutional 
right will not be deemed voluntary if it is made after the right to 
counsel has been invoked.”216  In Cunningham, the defendant was 
taken to police headquarters for questioning, where he was read his 
Miranda rights.217  At that time, the defendant agreed to speak with 
police, but made no incriminating statements.218  Later that 
evening, the officers formally informed the defendant that he was 
officially under arrest and reiterated the defendant’s Miranda 
rights.219  At this juncture, the defendant refused to waive his right 
to counsel.220  In response, the police told the defendant that he 
would have the opportunity to speak with an attorney after 
arraignment; however, the police made no effort to arrange for such 
 
212 Id. (emphasis added). 
213 See id. at 503. 
214 Id. at 504.  Chief Judge Cooke also observed: “This court’s vigilance in protecting the 
right to counsel finds additional support even in the ethical responsibility of attorneys in civil 
matters not to communicate on the subject of the representation with an individual known to 
be represented by an attorney on the matter.”  Id. at 503–04. 
215 See, e.g., People v. Claudio, 629 N.E.2d 384, 387 (N.Y. 1993) (“[People v. Skinner 
p]reserv[es] the integrity of an accused’s choice to communicate with police only through 
counsel.”); People v. Bell, 535 N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (N.Y. 1989) (“Our ruling [in People v. 
Skinner] was designed to prevent the police from rendering the right to counsel ineffective by 
questioning the defendant about matters relating to the subject of the representation in the 
absence of counsel retained on the matter.”). 
216 People v. Cunningham, 400 N.E.2d 360, 361 (N.Y. 1980). 
217 See id. at 362 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966)). 
218 See Cunningham, 400 N.E.2d at 362. 
219 See id. 
220 See id. 
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communications.221  Several hours later, the defendant informed 
police officers that he wanted to make a statement.  Once again, 
Miranda warnings were given.222  Although the defendant was 
asked to sign the waiver, he reiterated that he would like to speak 
with counsel.223  Despite repeatedly changing his mind about 
whether he would consent to questioning without an attorney, he 
ultimately waived his right and gave incriminating statements to 
the police.224 
Chief Judge Cooke instructed that “[o]nce an individual expresses 
the need for counsel[,] he or she stands in the same position as one 
who has obtained the aid of an attorney.”225  He declared that a 
defendant has not waived his or her right to counsel, after being 
assigned counsel, merely because the defendant does “not want the 
lawyer assigned to represent him.”226  Declaring a bright-line rule, 
Chief Judge Cooke stated that the right to counsel attaches in two 
distinct situations: (1) “upon the commencement of formal 
adversary proceedings,” and (2) in “cases in which formal adversary 
proceedings have not yet been commenced, but [involves] . . . 
suspects in custody who ha[ve] already retained or been assigned 
counsel to represent them on the specific charge for which they were 
being held.”227  Chief Judge Cooke explained “that a waiver of a 
constitutional right will not be deemed ‘voluntary’ unless the police 
have ‘scrupulously honored’ the suspect’s prior assertion of his 
rights.”228 
Although recognizing a need to protect the attorney-client 
relationship throughout his time of the bench, Chief Judge Cooke 
also observed that such protection could not to become a sprawling 
and elastic trap to impede police investigations.  For example, in 
People v. Mealer,229 Chief Judge Cooke demonstrated a fair and 
 
    221  See id. 
222 See id. 
223 See id. 
224 See id. 
225 People v. Skinner, 417 N.E.2d 501, 503 (N.Y. 1980) (citing Cunningham, 400 N.E. 2d at 
364). 
226 People v. Grimaldi, 422 N.E.2d 493, 495 n.* (N.Y. 1981). 
227 Cunningham, 400 N.E. 2d at 363, 364. 
228 Id. at 362–63 (citing People v. Dean, 393 N.E.2d 1030, 1031 (N.Y. 1979); People v. 
Clark, 380 N.E.2d 290, 295 (N.Y. 1978); People v. Munlin, 380 N.E.2d 288, 290 (N.Y. 1978); 
People v. Buxton, 44 N.Y.2d 33, 386–87 (N.Y. 1978)); see also Cunningham, 400 N.E.2d at 361 
(“[A]n uncounseled waiver of a constitutional right [to counsel] will not be deemed voluntary 
if it is made after the right to counsel has been invoked.”).  
229 People v. Mealer, 441 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1982).  In Mealer, the defendant was indicted 
for murder and subsequently suspected of perjury.  See id. at 1082.  The defendant bribed a 
witness for the state to offer perjured testimony.  See id. at 1081.  Although the “defendant’s 
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logical balance between the rights of state actors and those of the 
accused.230  He explained that “[t]he right to counsel may not be 
used as ‘a shield . . .’ to immunize one represented by an attorney 
against investigative techniques that capture a new crime in 
progress,’” a crime that is independent of the charge for which a 
defendant is indicted.231 
Similarly, in People v. Ferrara, Cooke directed that under the 
federal and New York State Constitutions, “retention of counsel in 
connection with a grand jury inquiry [does not] preclude[] 
investigative techniques that elicit in a noncustodial setting not a 
confession, but a plan to commit a new crime of the type then under 
scrutiny.”232 
D.  New York Practice 
Chief Judge Cooke also made significant contributions to the 
development of New York Civil Practice and Procedure.  He wrote a 
number of important opinions concerning the interpretation and 
application of state rules governing civil litigation, jurisdiction, res 
judicata, and statute of limitation defenses. 
 
 
right to counsel had attached with respect to the murder charge . . . [and] the witness was 
acting as a police agent when he met with [the] defendant with the knowledge and 
encouragement of the police . . . [the d]efendant’s right to counsel nevertheless was not 
violated.”  Id. at 1082 (internal citations omitted). 
230 See id. at 1082.  In Mirenda, Chief Judge Cooke ruled that a defendant does not have a 
state or federal constitutional right “to the assistance of a lawyer while conducting a pro se 
defense.”  People v. Mirenda, 442 N.E.2d 49, 50 (N.Y. 1982).  The defendant moved to appear 
pro se, but requested that he be “appointed counsel ‘to act only as an advisor.’”  Id.  Chief 
Judge Cooke rejected the defendant’s request, noting that “[t]he assignment of standby 
counsel . . . is a matter of trial management.  As such, it is a subject for the discretion of the 
trial judge, whose decision will not be disturbed by [the New York Court of Appeals] unless 
the judge abuses that discretion.”  Id. at 51. 
231 Mealer, 441 N.E.2d at 1082 (quoting People v. Ferrara, 430 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (N.Y. 
1981)) (citing People v. Middleton, 430 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (N.Y. 1981)).  The questioning of 
the defendant in relation to the new crime “was not used as a pretext for circumventing 
defendant’s rights.”  Mealer, 441 N.E.2d at 1082. 
232 People v. Ferrara, 430 N.E.2d 1275, 1277 (N.Y. 1981).  In Ferrara, the defendant 
testified twice before a grand jury.  Id. at 1276.  At the second grand jury hearing, the 
prosecutor informed the defendant and his attorney that the government believed that the 
defendant had committed perjury during his uncounseled testimony at the first grand jury 
hearing.  Id.  Despite this accusation, the defendant took the stand and denied paying 
kickbacks to a nursing home operator.  Id.  Subsequent to this counseled interaction, a police 
informant set up a meeting with the defendant and recorded the conversation in which the 
defendant offered to pay a kickback.  Id. at 1276–77.  Although unaware that his meeting 
with the informant had been recorded, the defendant denied paying kickbacks after being 
subpoenaed for a third grand jury hearing.  Id. at 1277.  The defendant was subsequently 
indicted for perjury.  Id. 
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In George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz,233 Chief Judge Cooke 
recognized that New York courts enjoy a liberal reign of jurisdiction 
over nonresidents pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1).234  In determining 
whether jurisdiction is proper under CPLR 302(a)(1), he noted that 
while a nonresident’s activities must be viewed collectively, there 
are also instances where a single act by a nondomiciliary defendant 
may be sufficient under the “transacting business” standard, 
without any further requirements, to establish personal 
jurisdiction.235  In Schwarz, the defendant, a Massachusetts 
resident, entered into New York to execute an agreement with a 
New York corporation for work to be performed outside the state as 
an out-of-state salesman.236  Years later, the corporation filed suit 
against the defendant for violating the terms of the agreement.237  
The defendant moved to dismiss the action based upon the court’s 
lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction.238  The defendant 
claimed that he had not transacted business within the State of 
New York, as he had only entered the state on a single occasion to 
execute an out-of-state employment agreement.239 
Chief Judge Cooke rejected the defendant’s jurisdictional defense, 
noting that he had purposefully entered into New York to execute 
an agreement with one of its residents and, by doing so, established 
a continuing relationship with a New York employer.240  He 
observed that the court’s exercise of jurisdiction was constitutional 
because the “defendant ha[d] purposefully availed himself of the 
privilege of conducting activities in our jurisdiction, thus invoking 
the benefits and protection of our laws.”241  He concluded that the 
nature and quality of the defendant’s actions were significant, and 
the execution of the contract was an obligatory commitment that 
created a continuing relationship with a resident of the state that 
developed for years after.242  Chief Judge Cooke explained that the 
 
233 George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz, 363 N.E.2d 551 (N.Y. 1977). 
234 See id. at 553. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 551–52. 
237 Id. at 552.  The corporation alleged that the defendant had “knowingly, willfully[,] and 
fraudulently violated the terms of the contract,” and it sought recovery for purported 
overdrawing of commissions.  Id. 
238 Id.  The Special Term granted the defendant’s motion, holding that plaintiff lacked 
personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1).  Id. at 551, 553.  However, a divided appellate 
division reversed and reinstated the complaint.  Id. at 551. 
239 Id. at 554–55 (quoting Hi Fashion Wigs, Inc. v. Peter Hammond Adv., Inc., 300 N.E.2d 
421, 423 (N.Y. 1973)). 
240 Schwartz, 363 N.E.2d at 555. 
241 Id. at 554. 
242 See id. at 554–55. 
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nature and quality of the contact is determinative, and not the 
quantity or professed isolation of a nonresident’s interaction with its 
residents.243 
Chief Judge Cooke concluded that the signing of the contract, 
although an isolated incident in time, triggered an ongoing 
relationship between the defendant and a corporation of the state 
that allowed the court to properly exercise its jurisdiction over the 
defendant under CPLR 302(a)(1).244  He explained that the 
defendant’s activities “cannot be reasonably viewed as merely the 
‘last act marking the formal execution of the contract.’”245  When 
analyzing the nature of the defendant’s contact, Chief Judge Cooke 
noted that this was more than a mere and casual attempt directed 
towards New York, as the purposeful activity of interviewing, 
negotiating and contracting “[required] no longer or more extensive 
negotiations or more detailed agreement . . . necessary to establish 
an employer-employee relationship.”246 
In O’Brien v. City of Syracuse,247 Chief Judge Cooke determined 
that the doctrine of res judicata bars “[a] property owner who 
unsuccessfully asserts against a governmental entity a claim for de 
facto appropriation . . . [from] later bring[ing] another action for 
trespass in an attempt to recover damages for the same acts as 
those on which the first lawsuit was grounded.”248  The plaintiffs 
owned property in an area that state officials had sought to 
restore.249  In 1973, the plaintiffs commenced an article 78 
proceeding contending that state actors had seriously interfered 
with their property rights during the rehabilitation process, which 
they contended amounted to a de facto appropriation by the city.250  
In a nonjury trial, the claim “was dismissed for failure to establish a 
de facto taking.”251  Following judgment, the plaintiffs filed another 
complaint, generally reasserting the allegations of the prior 
petition, and adding a claim of averment by which the city had 
taken the property by tax deed on June 1, 1977.252  The 
“[d]efendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res 
 
243 Id. at 555. 
244 See id. at 554, 555. 
245 Id. at 554. 
246 Id.  
247 O’Brien v. City of Syracuse, 429 N.E.2d 1158 (N.Y. 1981). 
248 Id. at 1159. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. 
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judicata, which . . . was granted with leave to amend.”253  
Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the same 
claims, “and adding . . . statements that [the] defendants [had] 
‘wrongfully, unlawfully and willfully’ trespassed” and damaged 
their “property at various times during the period 1967 to 1978.”254  
The defendants “moved to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata, 
statute of limitations, and failure to serve timely a notice of 
claim.”255  The state supreme court denied the motion on all 
grounds, and “concluded that no bar existed because there were 
involved materially different elements of proof for the two theories 
of recovery.”256  “The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, 
reversed on the reasoning that the entire action was barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata[.]”257 It dismissed the complaint in its 
entirety.258 
Chief Judge Cooke observed that the plaintiff’s current cause of 
action consisted of: “(1) those concerning activities underlying the 
1973 litigation; and (2) those asserting trespass generally.”259  He 
noted that “[o]nly the claims encompassed by the first category 
[we]re definitely barred by res judicata.”260  Conducting a 
transactional analysis, the Chief Judge determined that all of the 
claims presented during a prior suit, as the basis for that litigation, 
were barred since “[t]hat proceeding . . . [was] brought to a final 
conclusion, [and therefore,] no other claim [could] be predicated 
upon the same incidents.”261  He explained that: 
When alternative theories are available to recover what is 
essentially the same relief for harm arising out of the same 
or related facts such as would constitute a single “factual 
grouping,” the circumstance that the theories involve 
materially different elements of proof will not justify 
presenting the claim by two different actions.262   
Chief Judge Cooke agreed with the appellate division, observing 
 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Id.  
256 Id. 
257  Id. 
258 Id.  
259 Id. 
260 Id.  Chief Judge Cooke dismissed the complaint due to the plaintiff’s failure to serve 
timely a notice of claim, although finding that “the second category of allegations—the 
general trespass allegations—are not barred by res judicata to the extent that they describe 
acts occurring after the 1973 lawsuit.”  Id. at 1160. 
261 Id. at 1159. 
262 Id. at 1160. 
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that “once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims 
arising out of the same transaction . . . are barred, even if based 
upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy.”263  He 
observed: “In effect, de facto appropriation may be characterized as 
an aggravated form of trespass.  The pertinent evidence in both 
actions is the same.  The basic distinction lies in the egregiousness 
of the trespass and whether it is of such intensity as to amount to a 
taking.”264 
In McDermott v. Torre,265 Chief Judge Cooke addressed a 
significant statute of limitation question concerning a medical 
malpractice action against a physician and laboratory that had 
misdiagnosed the plaintiff’s mole as noncancerous.266  The treating 
physician had contacted the laboratory to review a specimen of the 
plaintiff’s mole.267  After reviewing the specimen, the laboratory 
informed the physician, who relayed the message to the plaintiff, 
that the results were negative and nothing further was required.268  
Over the next several years, the physician continued to treat the 
plaintiff for unrelated and general physical ailments.269  On 
occasion, however, the plaintiff complained about a pain in her 
ankle, which the physician “reassured her that there was no cause 
for concern.”270  Thereafter, the plaintiff discovered a lump in her 
groin, a malignant melanoma from the site where the mole had 
been removed four years earlier.271 
Chief Judge Cooke dismissed the plaintiff’s cause of action 
against the laboratory,272 finding that it was barred by the statute 
of limitations.273  He explained that the three-year statute of 
limitations applied for actions based on acts of continuous medical 
treatment, rather than the shorter period of CPLR 214-a.274  He 
noted that the plaintiff’s action against the laboratory was time-
barred because there was no evidence of continuing treatment by 
the laboratory and more than thirty-two months had elapsed 
 
263 Id. at 1159 (citing Reilly, 379 N.E.2d at 176). 
264 Id. at 1160.  
265 McDermott v. Torre, 437 N.E.2d 1108 (N.Y. 1982). 
266 See id. at 1109–10. 
267 Id. at 1110.  
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. at 1112. 
273 Id. at 1109, 1112.  
274 Id. at 1109, 1111 (noting that effective July 1, 1975, while plaintiff’s treatment was 
continuing, the period was reduced to 2.5 years under CPLR 214-a).   
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between plaintiff’s last visit and service of summons.275  As for the 
physician, Chief Judge Cooke noted that summary judgment was 
not appropriate, as there were issues of fact regarding whether 
there had been continuous treatment, thereby triggering the three-
year statute of limitations from the last date of treatment.276 
Notably, Chief Judge Cooke provided an in-depth discussion as to 
why the claim could not survive against the laboratory under the 
doctrine of “continuing treatment by the physician.”277  He 
explained that “[c]ontinuous treatment serves simply as a toll—the 
action may be brought at any time, but the patient will not be 
compelled to initiate judicial proceedings so long as the physician 
continues to treat the injury.”278  Cooke observed that “[i]mplicit in 
the policy is the recognition that the doctor not only is in a position 
to identify and correct his or her malpractice, but is best placed to 
do so.”279  As for the laboratory, however, he noted that these policy 
considerations did not apply, because the laboratory “does not have 
the opportunity to discover an error in a report.  Instead, it must 
rely on the treating physician to discover any diagnostic mistake.”280  
In this context, Cooke observed: “[T]he inquiry necessarily must be 
directed to the nature of a laboratory’s relationship to the 
patient.”281  He concluded that, in the absence of evidence showing 
an agency or other relevant relationship between the laboratory and 
doctor or some relevant continuing relation between the laboratory 
and the patient, the laboratories were nothing more than an 
independent contractor with no continuing relation to plaintiff to 
allow the continuing treatment to be imputed from the general care 
provider.282 
In Mills v. Monroe County,283 Chief Judge Cooke affirmed the 
appellate division’s decision to dismiss an employment 
discrimination claim as untimely.284  The plaintiff had failed to 
timely file a notice of claim against the county.285  Chief Judge 
Cooke observed that a time-barred claim may only continue if the 
action was brought to vindicate a public interest, or with leave of 
 
275 See id. at 1111. 
276 See id. 
277 See id. at 1109, 1112.  
278 Id. at 1111–12 (citing Borgia v. New York, 187 N.E.2d 777, 778 (N.Y. 1962)). 
279 Id. at 1112. 
280 Id. 
281 Id.  
282 See id. 
283 Mills v. Cty. of Monroe, 451 N.E.2d 456 (1983). 
284 See id. at 457.  
285 Id. at 456–57. 
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the court.286  He explained: 
When an employment discrimination action is brought 
against a county under the state or federal civil rights 
statutes, the failure to timely file a notice of claim shall be 
fatal unless the action has been brought to vindicate a public 
interest or leave to serve late notice has been granted by the 
court.287 
Chief Judge Cooke rejected the plaintiff’s contention that her 
cause of action was brought to vindicate a public interest, noting 
that her allegations were narrowly tailored to personal interest, and 
“her action seeks relief only for her termination, which she alleges 
resulted from her opposition to the county’s discriminatory practices 
and her race and national origin.”288  He further rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument that the notice of claim requirement contained 
in the state’s law—section 52 of the County Law—should not apply 
to either her federal or state civil rights claims.289  Cooke explained 
that “[i]f success of the § 1983 action were the only benchmark, 
there would be no reason at all to look to state law, for the 
appropriate rule would then always be the one favoring the 
plaintiff, and its source would be essentially irrelevant.”290  He 
concluded: “[T]he state’s notice requirements are [not] antithetical 
to the policy underlying the civil rights laws.”291 
In McDermott v. City of New York,292 Chief Judge Cooke reversed 
a trial court’s decision dismissing as untimely a third-party 
complaint by the city seeking indemnification from the 
manufacturer of a truck it had purchased.293  After being sued by 
one of its employees whose arm was severed by the sanitation 
truck’s hopper mechanism, the city brought a third-party action 
against the manufacturer alleging that the mechanism was 
defective.294  The manufacturer sought to dismiss the 
indemnification action as untimely, noting that the third-party 
complaint was commenced in 1975, although the truck was 
delivered to the city on February 5, 1969.295  Chief Judge Cooke 
 
286 Id. at 456. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. at 458–59 (noting that the plaintiff sought money damages for her loss of wages and 
damage to her reputation). 
289 Id. at 457. 
290 Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980)). 
291 Mills, 451 N.E.2d at 457.   
292 McDermott v. City of New York, 406 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1980). 
293 Id. at 461. 
294 Id. 
295 Id. 
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rejected this argument, explaining that the city’s cause for 
indemnification began accruing upon payment to its worker for his 
injuries, rather than from date of delivery of the sanitation truck, 
even though the third-party complaint by the city was based on 
products liability.296  He observed: “[G]iven the quasi contractual 
character of the indemnification action, it was obvious that the 
contract statute of limitations, now six years, would be held 
controlling.”297 
In Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co.,298 Chief Judge Cooke provided 
significant input, although in dissent, relating to the issue of when 
a medical claim “accrues” under the applicable statute of 
limitations.299  In Fleishman, the plaintiffs sought to recover 
damages as a result of medical injuries caused by their exposure to 
the drug Diethylstilbestrol (“DES”).300  The injuries suffered by the 
plaintiffs arose after the applicable statute of limitations had 
expired.301  The trial court granted the defendants motion to 
dismiss, holding that each complaint was time-barred.302  The New 
York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding 
that medical malpractice actions began to accrue when the plaintiffs 
were first exposed to DES and not when the injurious effect of the 
exposure manifested.303  The court observed that “[a]ny departure 
from the policies underlying these well-established precedents is a 
matter for the legislature and not the courts.”304  The court noted 
“that a cause of action for personal injuries caused by a toxic 
substance accrue[s] and the limitations period beg[ins] to run upon 
exposure to the substance.”305 
Disagreeing with the court’s rationale, Chief Judge Cooke 
observed: “[T]he law is not and should not be so inflexible that it 
 
296 See id. (“The cause of action for indemnification interposed against the manufacturer of 
an allegedly defective product is independent of the underlying wrong and for the purpose of 
the statute of limitations accrues when the loss is suffered by the party seeking indemnity.  
Hence, the dismissal of that part of the third-party complaint seeking indemnity, as barred by 
the four-year statute of limitations for breach of warranty measured from the date of tender 
of delivery . . . was unwarranted.”). 
297 Id. at 462. 
298 Fleishman v. Lilly & Co., 467 N.E.2d 517 (N.Y. 1984), cert denied 469 U.S. 1192 (1985), 
superseded by statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c (McKinney 2017). 
299 Fleishman, 467 N.E.2d at 519 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).  
300 Manno v. Levi, 465 N.Y.S.2d 219, 220 (App. Div. 1983), aff’d, 467 N.E.2d 517 (N.Y. 
1984), cert denied 469 U.S. 1192 (1985), superseded by statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c. 
301 Id. 
302 Id. at 221, 222. 
303 See Fleishman, 467 N.E.2d at 518. 
304 Id. at 518. 
305 Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 200–01 (N.Y. 1991) (citing Fleishman, 467 
N.E.2d at 518). 
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cannot correct itself from injustice and unfounded concerns 
espoused in prior decisions.”306  He explained that the doctrine 
controlling the dates in which a claim accrues “should not be used 
as a shield behind which a court may hide as reason for 
perpetuating unnecessary and profound unfairness, which subjects 
the law to ridicule.”307  Chief Judge Cooke rejected the proposition 
that the application of a statute of limitations is exclusively within 
the control and interpretation of the legislative body of 
government.308  He noted: 
That the determination of when a cause of action accrues is 
not solely a matter for the legislature, [and as] is plainly 
evident by this court’s determination here and previously, 
that a cause of action of this type accrues upon injury which 
is assumed to occur at the time of exposure, ingestion or 
injection of the cancer-causing foreign substance.309 
Chief Judge Cooke explained that the court had misinterpreted 
the policy behind the imposition of statute of limitations.310  He 
noted that the limitations run based upon the balancing of interests 
between the parties, ensuring that both parties’ interests are 
protected under the law.311  He concluded that “the balance of policy 
considerations weighs heavily in favor of plaintiffs and indicates 
that a discovery rule or, at the very least, a true date of medical-
injury rule should be adopted for the accrual of the causes of 
action.”312  As a result, he advocated that “[t]hese cases present a 
compelling argument for adopting a discovery rule.”313 
Notably, a few years later, the New York Court of Appeals 
overturned the Fleishman decision,314 as the state legislature 
 
306 Fleishman, 467 N.E.2d at 518 (citing Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (N.Y. 
1951)). 
307 Fleishman, 467 N.E.2d at 518. 
308 See id. at 519. 
309 Id. 
310 See id. at 519–20 (“A statute of limitations serves in part to prevent plaintiffs from 
sleeping on their rights or waiting to assert stale claims and to ensure that defendants will 
receive notice of claims as soon as practicable.  In these cases, the plaintiffs cannot be said to 
have purposefully or unreasonably waited to bring suit because no injuries were known by 
them to occur at the time of their ingestion of or exposure to DES.” (first citing Urie v. 
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949); then citing Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co. 371 A.2d 170, 174 
(N.H. 1977))). 
311 See Fleishman, 467 N.E.2d at 519 (quoting Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 335 
N.E.2d 275, 279 (N.Y. 1975)). 
312 Fleishman, 467 N.E.2d at 519. 
313 Id. at 520. 
314 See Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 200 (N.Y. 1991) (first citing Fleishman, 
467 N.Y.2d 198; then citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c (McKinney 2017)).  The court recognized that 
special rules have been fashioned by the legislature and “are a response to unique procedural 
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implicitly adopted Chief Judge Cooke’s proposition for an equitable 
discovery rule in unique medical cases, such as those presented by 
individuals exposed to DES.315  The state’s legislature enacted “a 
‘discovery’ statute of limitations [that] was directed at opening up 
traditional avenues of recovery by removing a procedural barrier 
that was unreasonable given the nature of DES injuries.”316  In 
1986, the New York State legislature recognized that “claims for 
injuries caused by exposure to DES and other toxic substances were 
often time-barred before the harmful effects of the exposure could be 
discovered, [and] changed the law to provide that the limitations 
period in exposure cases begins to run upon discovery of the 
injury.”317  The legislature also “revived for one year previously 
time-barred causes of action based on exposure to DES and four 
other toxic substances.”318 
E.  Privileges 
Chief Judge Cooke’s wrote several instructive opinions regarding 
a party’s right not to disclose information that is privileged.  In 
Matter of Beach v. Shanley,319 Chief Judge Cooke established that 
New York’s Shield Law (Civil Rights Law § 79-h) offered a broad 
and unqualified privilege to journalists who refused to disclose 
information or sources to state officials.320  Specifically, Chief Judge 
Cooke observed that the law created a journalistic privilege against 
compulsory disclosure of news sources to a grand jury, even if the 
source’s disclosure of information may itself have constituted 
criminal activity.321  In Beach, a grand jury investigation was 
conducted on the Rensselaer County sheriff’s office: a captain and 
lieutenant were alleged to be involved in illegal weapon sales.322  
The grand jury failed to indict either suspect, but issued damaging 
reports recommending their removal from official duty.323  An 
unidentified source contacted the defendant, a local television 
reporter, and offered information about the sealed reports 
contingent upon the defendant’s promise not to release the source’s 
 
barriers and problems of proof peculiar to DES litigation.”  Enright, 570 N.Y.2d at 201–02. 
315 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c. 
316 Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 202. 
317 Id. at 201 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c). 
318 Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 201 (citation omitted). 
319 Beach v. Shanley, 465 N.E.2d 304 (N.Y. 1984). 
320 See id. at 310. 
321 See id. at 309, 310. 
322 See id. at 306. 
323 See id. 
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identity.324  The defendant agreed, and later reported that the grand 
jury had recommended the removal of the sheriff.325  Thereafter, 
another grand jury convened to investigate the “disclosure of a 
certain sealed grand jury report.”326  The defendant was served with 
a subpoena to appear before the grand jury in an effort to determine 
“whether the contents of the sealed report were disclosed by a grand 
juror or a public official or public employee in violation of section 
215.70 of the Penal Law.”327  The defendant moved to quash the 
subpoena, which was eventually granted by the trial court.328 
Chief Judge Cooke rejected the district attorney’s contention that 
Article I of the New York State Constitution invalidated the 
evidentiary privileges set forth by the Shield Law when relating to 
grand jury subpoenas.329  He explained: “The constitutional 
provision against impairing a grand jury’s power was not intended 
to prevent the legislature from creating evidentiary privileges or 
their equivalent that have an incidental impact on investigations 
into willful misconduct by public officers.”330  Instead, Chief Judge 
Cooke thought that “the proposal was advanced solely for the 
purpose of making certain that the legislature of this state would 
never be able to . . . take from the grand jury its authority to 
investigate and indict for alleged criminal acts by public officials.”331  
He concluded that the relevant provisions of Article I targeted only 
“legislation that directly restricts a grand jury’s right to inquire or 
that, although facially neutral, would have its primary impact by 
limiting investigations of public officers.”332  He stated 
unequivocally that the Shield Law was not such a statute, since 
“[i]ts impact on investigations . . . [was] incidental.”333 
Chief Judge Cooke recognized that “a grand jury’s power to issue 
subpoenas is unfettered,”334 but the Shield Law was constructed to 
protect reporters from contempt, fine, or imprisonment for their 
 
324 See id. 
325 See id. 
326 Id.  
327 Id.  
328 See id. at 307 (noting that after the trial court quashed the subpoena, the appellate 
division reversed).  That court reasoned that the Shield Law was invalid because it “impaired 
a grand jury’s power to investigate public officials.”  Id. 
329 See id. at 311.  Article I, section 6, of the state Constitution proscribes the legislature 
from enacting any laws that impair or suspend a grand jury’s power to investigate willful 
misconduct.  N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. 
330 Beach, 465 N.E.2d at 310. 
331 Id. (quoting In re Wood v. Hughes, 173 N.E.2d 21, 24 (N.Y. 1961)). 
332 Beach, 465 N.E.2d at 311. 
333 Id. 
334 Id. at 307. 
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refusal to disclose information “regardless of whether the 
information is highly relevant to a governmental inquiry and 
whether the information was solicited or volunteered.”335  Chief 
Judge Cooke emphasized the plain language of the statute, which 
read that “[a]ny information obtained in violation of the . . . 
[statute] shall be inadmissible in any action or proceeding or 
hearing before any agency.”336  He noted that “the Shield Law 
provides a broad protection to journalists without any qualifying 
language.”337  Thus, the protection extended regardless of whether 
the reporter observed criminal activity or “even when the act of 
divulging the information was itself criminal conduct.”338 
In Matter of Bronx Cty. Grand Jury Investigation,339 Chief Judge 
Cooke rendered an important decision concerning both spousal and 
attorney-client privileges.340  The case stemmed from evidence 
gathered by the district attorney’s office in its investigation of the 
murder of Clara Vanderbilt.341  The defendant presumed that he 
was a target of the investigation.342  While at work, the defendant 
made a tape-recorded message addressed to his wife.343  That 
evening, the defendant unsuccessfully attempted suicide.344  The 
 
335 Id. at 309. 
336 Beach, 465 N.E.2d at 309 (quoting N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(d) (McKinney 2017)).  
337 Beach, 465 N.E.2d at 310.  Three years after Beach, in Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, 
Inc., the Court of Appeals readdressed the issue of the existence or nonexistence of a 
confidentiality requirement in the amended Shield Law.   See Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, 
Inc. v. Greenberg, 505 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370 (App. Div. 1986), aff’d, 511 N.E.2d 1116 (N.Y. 1987).  
The appellate division in Knight-Ridder declined to interpret Chief Judge Cooke’s language in 
Beach that the Shield Law afforded a “broad protection to journalists without any qualifying 
language” to nullify the requirement of a confidentiality agreement that the Shield Law 
originally required for privilege protections.  Id. at 371 (quoting Beach, 465 N.E.2d at 310).  
Years later, in Sullivan, the state supreme court in Queens County suggested that Beach 
overruled judicial interpretations of the Shield Law that maintained a confidentiality 
requirement throughout its various amendments, while Knight-Ridder reinstated the “cloak 
of confidentiality” to journalistic privilege.  See Sullivan v. Hurley, 635 N.Y.S.2d 437, 439 
(Sup. Ct. 1995) (quoting Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc., 511 N.E.2d at 1118). 
338 Beach, 465 N.E.2d at 310.  Judge Wachtler wrote a concurring opinion in Beach, stating 
that he would have deemed the quashing proper not just because of the Shield Law privilege 
but because such protection should be a matter of right under the state constitutional 
freedom of the press.  Id. at 311 (Wachtler, J., concurring).  Chief Judge Cooke declined to 
conduct a constitutional analysis, noting that “[c]ourts should not decide constitutional 
questions when a case can be disposed of on a nonconstitutional ground.”  Id. (majority 
opinion).  Judge Meyer issued a dissent in Beach.  Id. at 312 (Meyer, J., dissenting).  He 
argued that the majority misinterpreted the scope of Article I, section 6, by erroneously 
searching for intent beyond the “clarity of the constitutional provision.”  See id. at 312–13. 
339 In re Bronx Cty. Grand Jury Investigation, 439 N.E.2d 378 (N.Y. 1982). 
340 See id. at 380. 
341 See id. 
342 See id. 
343 See id. 
344 See id. 
THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF CHIEF JUDGE COOKE  
1274 Albany Law Review [Vol. 80.4 
defendant’s wife later discovered the tape.345  She did not listen to 
the tape, but instead gave it to her friend, who was an attorney.346  
Thereafter, the defendant’s office was searched for additional 
documents and recordings.347  A second tape was found in his 
desk.348  Both tapes were eventually received and held by the 
defendant’s attorney.349  Although the defendant was ordered to 
turn over the tapes, he failed to comply.350  The defendant argued 
that the first tape contained information protected by the marital 
privilege and the second tape was protected by both the attorney-
client privilege and his right against self-incrimination.351 
The trial court quashed the subpoenas, but was reversed on 
appeal.352  The appellate division rejected both arguments of 
privilege.353  The court observed that the privilege applies only to 
confidential statements “induced by the marital relation and 
prompted by the affection, confidence and loyalty engendered by 
such relationship.”354  The court also ordered a scientific inspection 
of the first tape to determine whether its content had been 
altered.355   As to the first tape, Chief Judge Cooke rejected the 
appellate division’s holding.  He found that a communication is 
made during marriage even if the intention is that the message will 
be received after death, because such a communication cannot be 
considered to be made in contemplation of destroying the 
marriage.356  He observed that the exception for statements aimed 
at destroying a marriage concerns the “nature of the statement 
itself.”357  Chief Judge Cooke explained that a declaration made 
during a suicide attempt might possibly be the “last attempt to 
preserve the affection that gave rise to the marriage.”358  In the 
absence of any other evidence on the record suggesting otherwise, 
he determined that the messages were indeed induced by the 
marriage.359 
 
345 See id. 
346 See id. at 380–81. 
347 See id. at 381. 
348 See id. 
349 See id. 
350 See id. 
351 See id. 
352 Id.  
353 Id.  
354 Id. at 382.  
355 Id. at 381. 
356 See id. at 382. 
357 Id.  
358 Id.  
359 Id.  
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To satisfy the element of confidentiality, Chief Judge Cooke noted 
that the defendant delivered it to his wife, outside the presence of 
the third parties, who then effectively delivered it to the lawyer.360  
He explained that when the lawyer first found the tape, only the 
two spouses knew of its existence and message.361  Thus, the 
delivery of the tape to third parties for safekeeping did not destroy 
the privilege, because the third parties had “no justifiable interest 
in becoming privy to the marital privilege.”362  Chief Judge Cooke 
further explained that the privilege only fails “when the substance 
of a communication, and not the mere fact of its occurrence, is 
revealed to third parties.”363  Moreover, Chief Judge Cooke did not 
find a basis for ordering a scientific examination of the tape, since 
“[o]nce it is determined that the contents of the tape were 
privileged, it is irrelevant whether there have been erasures or 
other deletions.”364 
In regard to the second tape, Chief Judge Cooke declined to accept 
the defense’s argument that the attorney’s disclosure of the tape 
would violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment protection against 
self-incrimination.365  He observed that an attorney may not directly 
assert a protection claim based on a Fifth Amendment right held by 
his client.366  The coercive power of the subpoena is directed at the 
attorney, but production would in no way self-incriminate him to 
implicate the commands of the Fifth Amendment.367  Nevertheless, 
Chief Judge Cooke did accept the defendant’s argument that “[a]n 
attorney may rely on the attorney-client privilege to prevent 
discovery of materials that would not have been discoverable if in 
the client’s hands.”368  Chief Judge Cooke undertook a two-pronged 
analysis to determine if an attorney can assert attorney-client 
privilege to prevent discovery of materials that would not have been 
discoverable in the client’s possession.369  The first factor was 
whether the attorney received the material under circumstances 
giving rise to the privilege.370  If so, then the court must consider 
whether the material would have been protected in the client’s 
 
360 See id.  
361 Id.  
362 Id.  
363 Id. at 382–83. 
364 Id. at 383. 
365 See id. 
366 Id.  
367 Id. 
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possession.371 
Chief Judge Cooke explained: 
While it is true that the attorney-client privilege does not 
attach unless there is a “confidential communication” 
between counsel and his or her client, this does not require 
that all aspects of the communication, including its topic, 
must be confidential for the privilege to attach.  Rather, the 
pertinent “confidence” arises from the attorney-client 
relationship and the privacy of the conversation or 
communication to the attorney.372 
Chief Judge Cooke explained that only actual disclosure, and not 
mere intent, will breach the privilege.373  Therefore, if no actual 
disclosure has occurred, the privilege remains intact even if the 
client had intended to disclose the substance of the material.374  
Ultimately, the Chief held that the attorney-client privilege 
attached because the tape’s recording was uttered only to the 
lawyer “by his client who was seeking legal advice and outside the 
presence of any third party with no intention that it be passed to 
another.”375 
Furthermore, Chief Judge Cooke observed that had the tape 
remained in the defendant’s possession, it would have been 
protected.376  He explained that testimonial evidence is “that which 
communicates the witness’s ideas or thoughts, that exposes the 
witness’s mental state or thought process.”377  Both the evidence 
and the act of production must include “some testimonial 
quality.”378  Chief Judge Cooke reasoned that the lawyer’s 
production of the tape was “testimonial by virtue of his 
authentication, express or implied, of the tape,” including “the 
circumstances of its preparation, its accuracy, and the conclusions 
drawn from it.”379 
 
371 Id. 
372 Id. at 384. 
373 Id. 
374 Id. 
375 Id. 
376 Id. at 384–85, 386.  Judge Jasen authored a partial concurring and dissenting opinion 
in this case.  Id. at 386 (Jasen, J., dissenting).  He disagreed that the second tape was 
protected by the attorney-client privilege.  Id. at 387.  Even though the defendant’s wife 
delivered the tape to the lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, the lawyer conceded 
that he never listened to it.  Id. at 388.  Therefore, Judge Jasen reasoned, there was only a 
disclosure of the existence of the tape, which could hardly be confidential considering the 
multiple persons who had knowledge of the tape’s existence.  Id. at 387. 
377 Id. at 385 (majority opinion). 
378 Id.  
379 Id.  
THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF CHIEF JUDGE COOKE  
2016/2017]          The Life and Legacy of Chief Judge Cooke 1277 
F.  Family Law 
Chief Judge Cooke wrote many instructive opinions dealing with 
family law.  His sense of fairness and his desire for justice in 
judicial proceedings was most evident in his resolve of matters 
concerning paternity, child custody, and parental rights. 
For example, in Matter of Vicki B. & David H.,380 Chief Judge 
Cooke decided that a paternity proceeding to determine paternity of 
a child born out of wedlock was not barred by the statute of 
limitations when the putative father had acknowledged being the 
father by providing financial support during the child’s infancy.381  
He observed that “[w]hen a putative father has acknowledged 
paternity either in writing or through the furnishing of support 
payments, the time within which a paternity proceeding must be 
brought is not restricted by any statutory limitation.”382  He 
reversed the appellate division and reinstated the family court 
order finding no time bar.383   
In Dickson v. Lascaris,384 Chief Judge Cooke reversed the denial 
of a father’s petition to regain custody of his children from a third 
party.385  Specifically, the father petitioned the court to reclaim 
custody of his three children, who he had entrusted to a friend.386  
After his wife’s refusal to help with the upbringing of the children, 
he tried to raise the children himself.387  However, after realizing he 
could not manage such task alone, he entrusted the care of his 
children to a friend of his father.388  Several years later, after 
remarrying and establishing regular contact with his children, he 
sought to regain custody.389  Granting his request, Chief Judge 
Cooke explained: “[B]etween a parent and a third person, parental 
custody of a child may not be displaced absent grievous cause or 
necessity.”390  He stated: “[A] child is not a piece of property over 
whom title may be acquired by adverse possession,”391 and that 
when deciding who should have custody of the child, the best 
 
380 In re Vicki B. v. David H., 442 N.E.2d 1248 (N.Y. 1982). 
381 Id. at 1248. 
382 Id. 
383 See id. at 1249. 
384 In re Dickson v. Lascaris, 423 N.E.2d 361 (N.Y. 1981).  
385 See id. at 362. 
386 See id.  
387 See id. 
388 See id. 
389 See id. at 363. 
390 Id.  
391 Id. at 364. 
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interests of that child must always come first.392 
Similarly, in Matter of Leon R.R.,393 Chief Judge Cooke reversed 
the family court’s granting of a petition to terminate parental rights 
of a child’s natural parents.394  The child was removed from the 
custody of his parents when he was a year and a half old because of 
accusations of neglect.395  He remained with his foster parents for 
over eight years, after which time, measures were taken to 
reintegrate him back with his natural parents.396  However, efforts 
by the foster agency seemingly left the natural parent’s requests 
unanswered.397  The agency alleged that the child was a 
permanently neglected child, and therefore wanted to terminate the 
parental rights and award permanent custody to the foster 
parents.398 
Chief Judge Cooke rejected the agency’s request, noting that they 
failed to show that the natural parents permanently neglected the 
child as required by law.  He noted that the agency was required to 
prove that the parents: 
[F]ailed for a period of more than one year following the date 
such child came into the care of an authorized agency 
substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain 
contact with or plan for the future of the child, although 
physically and financially able to do so, notwithstanding the 
agency’s diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the 
parental relationship when such efforts will not be 
detrimental to the best interests of the child.399 
Chief Judge Cooke also found that the record demonstrated that 
the respondents availed themselves of every opportunity to 
strengthen the parent-child relationship between them and the 
child, but that the petitioner had sought to impede these 
attempts.400 
In People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard,401 Chief Judge Cooke issued 
an opinion protecting the right of grandparents to remain in contact 
with a grandchild who was taken from the natural mother after 
 
392 See id. at 363–64 (citing Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 283 (N.Y. 1976)). 
393 In re Leon R.R., 397 N.E.2d 374 (N.Y. 1979).  
394 See id. at 376. 
395 See id. 
396 See id.  
397 See id. at 377. 
398 See id. at 379. 
399 Id. 
400 See id.  
401 People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d 1049 (N.Y. 1981).  
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neglect proceedings.402  The petitioner, the child’s grandmother, 
visited the child regularly until his temporary custodians 
(respondents) adopted him.403  After adoption, the respondents 
made it difficult for her to visit, which led to a petition under section 
72 of the New York Domestic Relations Law to preserve the 
vitiation rights of the child’s natural grandparent.404  Chief Judge 
Cooke declared that an adopted child may not be completely 
isolated from her natural born family, especially when statutory law 
grants the natural grandparents a visitation right if in the child’s 
best interest.405  He rejected the respondent’s contention that 
section 117 of the Domestic Relations Law allowed the rights of the 
natural family of an adopted child to be severed at the time of 
adoption.406  Similarly, Chief Judge Cooke rejected the respondent’s 
constitutional challenges (invasion of familial privacy), noting that 
parents are not free to act in whatever way they wish.407  He 
explained that a family is within the scope of regulation if it is for 
the benefit of public policy, and permitting a natural grandparent to 
visit with their grandchild does not impede on any constitutional 
rights to privacy.408 
In In re Sheila G.,409 Chief Judge Cooke issued an opinion 
establishing the duty of child-care agencies to facilitate and assist 
parents in maintaining contact with children held in the agency’s 
temporary care.  There, a child was born out of wedlock and 
voluntarily placed up for adoption by her mother with the New York 
City Department of Social Services.410  The child was then placed in 
foster care with Brookwood Child Care Agency.411  A month and a 
half later, her natural born father contacted Brookwood requesting 
a meeting with agency officials, in which he stated that he wanted 
to be able to visit with and financially support the child.412  The 
agents at Brookwood informed the father that the mother had 
adamantly refused permission for him to contact his daughter, and 
 
402 See id. at 1050. 
403 See id. 
404 Id.  New York law recognizes the rights of a natural grandparent and states that “when 
one or both parents are deceased, a proceeding in habeas corpus may be brought against a 
person who has ‘the care, custody, and control of’ the grandchild.”  Id. (quoting N.Y. DOM. 
REL. LAW § 72(1) (McKinney 2017)).   
405 See Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d at 1051–52. 
406 See id. at 1050–51. 
407 Id. at 1052. 
408 See id.  
409 In re Sheila G., 462 N.E.2d 1139 (N.Y. 1984).  
410 Id. at 1141. 
411 Id. 
412 Id. 
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he was told that until he could formally establish paternity, the 
agents would be bound by the mother’s wishes.413  Months later, the 
mother decided to allow visitation rights to the father,414 who 
planned to adopt the child in the near future after being able to 
determine paternity.415  Later, the agency rejected his request, 
noting that it took eighteen months total.416  The agency noted that 
the lapse of time was indicative of his inability to plan for the child’s 
future.417  The family court denied the agency’s petition for 
permanent neglect and noted that it had undermined the potential 
relationship between the father and child.418  However, the court 
was reversed by the appellate division, which found that the 
father’s procrastination gave rise to a determination of permanent 
neglect.419 
Rejecting the appellate division’s finding, Chief Judge Cooke 
explained: 
When a child-care agency has custody of a child and brings a 
proceeding to terminate parental rights on the ground of 
permanent neglect, it must affirmatively plead in detail and 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that it has fulfilled 
its statutory duty to exercise diligent efforts to strengthen 
the parent-child relationship and to reunite the family.  Only 
when this duty has been deemed satisfied may a court 
consider and determine whether the parent has fulfilled his 
or her duties to maintain contact with and plan for the 
future of the child.420 
Chief Judge Cooke explained that only when an agency has tried 
to assist a parent in meaningful ways, such as: providing counseling 
with respect to a problem that interferes with the return of the 
 
413 Id. 
414 Id.  
415 Id. 
416 See id. at 1142. 
417 See id.  The definition for “permanent neglect” is codified in section 384-b(7) of the New 
York Social Services law, which provides that a permanently neglected child:  
[M]ean[s] a child who is in the care of an authorized agency and whose parent or 
custodian has failed for a period of more than one year following the date such child 
came into the care of an authorized agency substantially and continuously or repeatedly 
to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although physically and 
financially able to do so, notwithstanding the agency’s diligent efforts to encourage and 
strengthen the parental relationship when such efforts will not be detrimental to the 
best interests of the child. 
Id. at 1145. 
418 See id. at 1143. 
419 See id. at 1144. 
420 Id. at 1140–41. 
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child; assisting in planning for a child’s future; aiding in attaining a 
house; or scheduling regular and meaningful visits between the 
child and the parent, then the agency will be found to have satisfied 
its statutory duty.421 
Chief Judge Cooke noted that the agency made no attempts to 
assist the father, who presented them with two separate plans to 
gain custody of his child.422  In fact, the agency frustrated his 
attempts and made it difficult for him to regain custody by failing to 
make suitable arrangements for visits.423  Chief Judge Cooke held 
that the agency acted with complete indifference to the father’s 
goals, failing to satisfy its statutory obligations.424  Chief Judge 
Cooke noted: “[I]t is doubtful whether it could be found to be in the 
child’s best interest to deny her [parent’s] persistent demands for 
custody simply because it took so long for [him] to obtain it 
legally.”425 
CONCLUSION 
Chief Judge Cooke was not only an accomplished judge, but also a 
human being of the finest caliber.  He was a leader in all aspects of 
life, a man of integrity, and a being of moral excellence.  Chief 
Judge Cooke’s legacy as a man, judge, and public leader is truly 
exemplary, because: 
However high he rose in public life, however powerful he 
became, however long the list of his accomplishment, [he] 
treated everyone, everyone, with kindness and respect.  The 
fact is he changed a lot of things, but some things never 
changed.  His hat size never changed.  His concern for people 
never changed, and he never deviated from his own 
fundamental values.  Always he took the high road.426 
For his contributions as a judge, Professor Bonventre best 
explained that Chief Judge Cooke will be most remembered: 
[F]or his tenure on the Court of Appeals, as its foremost 
guardian of individual rights, its most unrelenting opponent 
of inequity, oppression, and inhumane treatment.  For his 
human dimension to judging.  For his sensitivity to 
individual and community needs, for his commitment to 
 
421 See id. at 1147, 1148. 
422 Id. at 1149. 
423 Id. at 1149–50. 
424 Id. at 1150.  
425 Id. (quoting In re Sanjivini K., 391 N.E.2d 1316, 1320 (N.Y 1979)). 
426 Judith S. Kaye, Eulogy for Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, 64 ALB. L. REV. 5, 7 (2000). 
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reducing injustice, and elevating the conduct of public 
officials.427 
Upon his unfortunate passing on August 17, 2000,428 it was clear 
that the New York State judiciary and the legal community had 
been blessed to be amidst greatness.429  “He served the state 
brilliantly to the very last minute, [and] to speak only from the 
record books would ignore the amazing warmth he always displayed 
. . . . His mission was to treat everyone equally.  Always, he took the 
high road.”430 
Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, we cherish your memory and 
continue to follow your wisdom and unwavering dedication of 
service to the law, your community, and the State of New York.431 
 
 
 
427 Bonventre, supra note 72, at 1. 
428 Adolfsen & Adolfsen, supra note 34. 
429 See, e.g., William H. Honan, Lawrence H. Cooke, 85, New York Chief Judge, Dies, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/19/nyregion/lawrence-h-cooke-85-
new-york-chief-judge-dies.html.  
430 John Emerson, County Mourns at Judge Cooke’s Funeral, SULLIVAN COUNTY DEMOCRAT 
(Aug. 25, 2000), http://www.sc-democrat.com/archives/2000/news/08August/25/cooke.html. 
431 As former Chief Judge Kaye expressed, Judge Cooke “wasn’t just born with the love of 
his community, he earned it every single day.”  Kaye, supra note 426, at 7. 
